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ABSTRACT This survey presents a comprehensive review of current literature on Explainable Artificial
Intelligence (XAI) methods for cyber security applications. Due to the rapid development of Internetconnected systems and Artificial Intelligence in recent years, Artificial Intelligence including Machine
Learning and Deep Learning has been widely utilized in the fields of cyber security including intrusion
detection, malware detection, and spam filtering. However, although Artificial Intelligence-based
approaches for the detection and defense of cyber attacks and threats are more advanced and efficient
compared to the conventional signature-based and rule-based cyber security strategies, most Machine
Learning-based techniques and Deep Learning-based techniques are deployed in the ‘‘black-box’’ manner,
meaning that security experts and customers are unable to explain how such procedures reach particular
conclusions. The deficiencies of transparencies and interpretability of existing Artificial Intelligence
techniques would decrease human users’ confidence in the models utilized for the defense against cyber
attacks, especially in current situations where cyber attacks become increasingly diverse and complicated.
Therefore, it is essential to apply XAI in the establishment of cyber security models to create more
explainable models while maintaining high accuracy and allowing human users to comprehend, trust, and
manage the next generation of cyber defense mechanisms. Although there are papers reviewing Artificial
Intelligence applications in cyber security areas and the vast literature on applying XAI in many fields
including healthcare, financial services, and criminal justice, the surprising fact is that there are currently no
survey research articles that concentrate on XAI applications in cyber security. Therefore, the motivation
behind the survey is to bridge the research gap by presenting a detailed and up-to-date survey of XAI
approaches applicable to issues in the cyber security field. Our work is the first to propose a clear roadmap
for navigating the XAI literature in the context of applications in cyber security.
INDEX TERMS Artificial intelligence, cyber security, deep learning, explanation artificial intelligence,
intrusion detection, machine learning, malware detection, spam filtering.
I. INTRODUCTION

Cyber Security is the practice of securing networks, devices,
and data against unauthorized access or illegal usage, as
well as the art of maintaining information confidentiality,
integrity, and availability [1], whereas cyber defensive
mechanisms emerge at the application, network, host, and
data levels [2]. As the Internet has become an essential tool
in everyone's daily life, the number of systems linked to the
Internet grows as well. The advancement of computer
networks, servers, and mobile devices has significantly
boosted Internet usage. However, the wide utilization of the

Internet also tempts cyber attackers to develop more
sophisticated and powerful cyber-attack methods for their
benefit. It is noticeable that with the number of internet users
worldwide increasing by 0.3 billion in 2021 compared with
the previous year [3], global cyber attacks increased by 29%
in 2021 according to the 2021 Cyber Trends Report [4]. In
June of 2022, a cyberattack on a software business caused
thousands of individuals in multiple states of the USA to lose
their unemployment benefits and job-search help [5], which
will lead to severe social instability during the COVID-19
pandemic. As a matter of fact, according to the report by the
European Union Agency for Network and Information
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Security (ENISA) [6], safe and trustworthy cyberspace is
expected to become even more crucial in the new social and
economic norms formed by the COVID-19 epidemic. These
figures and events demonstrate the serious facts that the
Internet and connected networks and devices have suffered
more cybercriminals and cyber attacks nowadays.
Therefore, a stable and secure cyber security computer
system must be established to ensure the information privacy,
accessibility, and integrity transmitted within the Internet.
Nevertheless, the conventional signature-based and rulebased cyber defensive mechanisms are facing challenges
within the increasing quantities of information spread over
the Internet [7]. On the other hand, cyber hackers are always
striving to keep one step ahead of law enforcement by
generating new, smart, and intricate attacking techniques and
implementing technological advances including Artificial
Intelligence to make their adversarial behaviors more
sophisticated and efficient [8]. As a consequence, researchers
in cyber security have begun to investigate Artificial
Intelligence-based approaches especially Machine Learning
and Deep Learning rather than traditional (non-AI)
cybersecurity techniques including Game theory, Rate
Control, and Autonomous systems to enhance the
performance of cyber defensive systems.
Although Artificial Intelligence techniques, especially
Machine Learning and Deep Learning algorithms could
provide impressive performances on benchmark datasets in a
number of cyber security domain applications such as
Intrusion detection, spam e-mail filtering, Botnet detection,
fraud detection, and malicious application identification [9].
Despite the excellent performance of Machine Learning and
Deep Learning algorithms, they can commit errors, some of
which are more expensive than conventional cyber defensive
approaches. On the other hand, cyber security developers
have sometimes sought higher accuracy at the price of
interpretability, making their models more intricate and
difficult to grasp [10]. This lack of explainability has been
disclosed by the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation, preserving the capacity to comprehend the logic
behind an Artificial Intelligence algorithmic decision that
negatively impacts individuals [11]. Accordingly, to be able
to believe the decisions of cyber security systems, Artificial
Intelligence must be transparent and interpretable. To satisfy
these kinds of demands, several strategies have been
proposed to make Artificial Intelligence decisions more
intelligible to humans. And these explainable techniques are
usually shortened as “XAI”, which have already been
implemented in many application domains such as healthcare,
Natural Language Processing, and financial services [12].
And the objective of this research paper is to focus on the
applications of XAI in different fields in the context of cyber
security.

Implementing Artificial Intelligence in applications of cyber
security has been researched in recent years and many
previous surveys reviewed the existing work in this field. On
the other hand, the trends of applying XAI to provide more
explainable and transparent services for areas including
healthcare and image analysis are popular in research as well.
However, to the best of our knowledge, although there are
some other excellent survey papers available on the topics of
XAI and cyber security independently, there is a lack of a
comprehensive survey paper focusing on the review of
solutions based on XAI across a wide variety of cyber
security applications. This survey also concludes with special
deep analytical insights based on their opinions. These
findings reveal several holes that may be filled using XAI
methods, indicating the overall future direction of research in
this domain.
In general, this survey intends to provide a comprehensive
review of state-of-art XAI applications in the cyber security
area. The research motivations behind this work are listed as
followings:
(1) To review different techniques and categorizations of
XAI.
(2) To review existing challenges and problems of XAI.
(3) To identify the frameworks and available datasets for the
XAI-based cyber defensive mechanism.
(4) To review the latest successful XAI-based systems and
applications in the cyber security domain.
(5) To identify challenges and research gaps of XAI
applications in cyber security.
(6) To identify the key insights and future research
directions for applying XAI in the cyber security area.
B. PREVIOUS SURVEYS

XAI and cyber security have been reviewed mostly
separately in previous surveys. However, crossovers have
emerged between the two domains. This survey presented a
comprehensive introduction of different XAI techniques
applied in cyber defensive systems. Our work also provided
comprehensive XAI categorizations and analyzed details
about the existing challenges and frameworks of XAI for
cyber security. Cyber security datasets available for XAI
models and the cyber threats faced by XAI models are
discussed in this paper as well. Table 1 contrasts our study
with currently available surveys and reviewing articles.
Many existing surveys only analyzed AI applications, either
Machine Learning or Deep Learning, in the cyber security
area, whereas other authors review XAI methods for a
narrow set of cyber security applications. And some
reviewers could not describe the background of XAI and
cyber security in detail. Furthermore, most articles discuss
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TABLE 1. Comparison of existing surveys with our work (legend: √ means included; N/A means not included; ≈ means partially included)
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FIGURE 1. Structure of this paper.

only AI applications in cyber security or XAI implemented in
other domains rather than focusing on cyber security.
From Table 1, it is obvious that this survey is
comprehensive and distinct in including the following
features in comparison to previously published survey
research in the field: summarizing commonly used cyber
security datasets available, discussing popular XAI tools and
their applications in the cyber security area, analyzing the
XAI applications in defending different categories of cyber
attacks, providing assessment measures for evaluating the
performance of XAI models, giving descriptions on the
adversarial cyber attacks which XAI itself may suffer, and
pointing out some key insights about applying XAI for cyber
security.
C. SCOPE OF CYBER SECURITY ANALYSED

In agreement with the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO/IEC 27032) [37], cyber security is
defined as the privacy, integrity, and availability of
internet data. Cyber attacks are cybercriminal attacks
undertaken using one or more computers against a single
or numerous computers or networks. A cyber assault can
purposefully destroy systems, steal data, or utilize a
compromised computer as a launch pad for more attacks
[38]. Due to the wide spreading of cyber attacks and
threats, the cyber security industries are seeing rapid

expansion. As a result, by 2026, the worldwide
cybersecurity sector is anticipated to be worth 345.4
billion USD [39]. On the other hand, besides the
conventional cyber attacks including malware, botnet, and
spam, adversarial cyber security threats specifically
targeting AI models are Gradually emerging in recent
years as well [24]. Therefore, the scope for the domain of
cyber security analyzed in this survey paper will be
constituted in the following 3 sub-fields in conjunction
with XAI:
1) Different categories of the most prominent cyber
attacks including malware, Botnet, spam, fraud,
phishing, Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) attacks,
network intrusion, Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks,
Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, Domain
Generation Algorithms (DGAs), and Structured
Query Language (SQL) injection attacks are
described in detail respectively. By doing so, the
terminologies of cyber attacks are clear and the
defensive systems against these attacks are
discussed in this paper as well.
2) Cyber security implementation in different
industrial areas including smart grid, healthcare,
smart agriculture, smart transportation, HumanComputer Interaction(HCI), and smart financial
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FIGURE 2. Research methodology flow chart.

system will be reviewed in this survey. This paper
provides a brief introduction of XAI for cyber
security in each domain respectively.
3) While XAI is implemented in many different
scenarios to defend against cyber threats, XAI
models will face adversarial attacks targeting XAI
models as well. This survey will investigate cyber
security from this perspective as well. Adversarial
threats targeting XAI, defense approaches against
these attacks, and the establishment of secure XAI
cyber systems will be interpreted respectively.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS

This study extensively evaluates current breakthroughs and
state-of-the-art XAI-based solutions in a wide variety of
cyber security applications and cyber attack defensive
mechanisms to address the gaps and shortcomings mentioned
in earlier surveys. There is no previous survey available
analyzing the state-of-art XAI applications in cyber security
systemically from the perspectives of both cyber attack
defensive schemes and industrial applications. Our research's
contributions can be summarized in the following points:
1) We rationalize the motivations for integrating XAI
in AI-based cyber security models whereas the
basic background on XAI is presented.
2) We provide a thorough summary as well as a quick
overview of the datasets that are accessible for the

3)

4)
5)
6)

usage of XAI applications in cyber security.
We discuss different categories of defensive
applications of XAI against cyber attacks
respectively, and we highlight the advantages and
limitations to develop XAI-based cyber-defense
systems.
We justify XAI for cyber security in different
industry scenarios.
We illustrate Adversarial cyber threats pointing to
XAI models are described whereas the defense
approaches against these attacks.
We outline the outstanding issues and existing
challenges associated with the intersection of XAI
and cyber security, and we identify the key insights
and future research directions for the XAI
applications in cyber security.

E. STRUCTURE OF THIS SURVEY

As shown in Fig 1, this survey has been organized in such a
way that the background information for the research being
examined comes first. Section II introduces the methodology
of research on this survey in the field of XAI applications in
cyber security. Section III discusses the general background
of XAI, motivations, categorizations, and challenges of XAI
are justified in this section. The section after that (Section IV)
is organized based on the XAI framework and available
datasets for cyber security. Section V will be devoted to a
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comprehensive discussion of XAI applications in cyber
security from different perspectives. The existing challenges,
key insights, and future directions of this area are highlighted
in Section VI, which is followed by the conclusion. And the
conclusion would be the last section, which is Section VII.
TABLE 2. Research searching database engines.

Searching Engines
Springer
Taylor & Francis
Semantic Scholar
ACM Digital Library
ResearchGate
Google Scholar
IEEE Xplore
Elsevier
Research Rabbit

Database Address
https://link.springer.com/
https://taylorandfrancis.com/
https://www.semanticscholar.org/
https://dl.acm.org/
https://www.researchgate.net/
https://scholar.google.com/
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org
https://www.elsevier.com/
https://researchrabbitapp.com/

FIGURE 3. Percentage of Reviewed Papers from Sources.

research state-of-art in the areas of XAI applications in cyber
security. Therefore, to collect the research articles reviewed,
the following criteria were established:
1) A thorough search was carried out whereas

different academic search engines illustrated in
Table 2 were utilized to collect the relevant
papers.

2) The searching keywords for this survey paper were
constituted as 2 aspects: “XAI” and “Cyber
Security”. To create the search string, all potential
pertinent synonyms of the given terms were
discovered in different databases and the percentage
of reviewed papers from sources was depicted in
Figure 3. The following synonyms may be pertinent
to the subject: “Cyber Security”, “Cyber Physical”,
“Cyber Attack”, “Cyber Threat”, Network Security”,
“Cyber Crime”, “XAI”, “Explainable Artificial
Intelligence”, “Interpretable Artificial Intelligence”,
“Explainable Machine Learning (XML)”, and
“Transparent Artificial Intelligence”.
3) Only researches published between 2011 and 2022
were selected to report on the most recent trends in
the application of XAI techniques in cyber security
for this research. Besides, papers published after
2017 were given higher attention and occupied a
large proportion of all reviewed publications, as
shown in Figure 4.
4) Only publications written in the English language
were included in this review and duplicated studies
were excluded.
5) Only papers objecting to cyber security vulnerability
domains were reviewed in this survey paper whereas
researches proposing Machine Learning-based
systems, Deep Learning-based systems, XAI-based
mechanisms, and AI-based mechanisms would be
extracted.
The procedure of choosing articles was instantaneous and
consisted of two steps: firstly, the searching results were
initially chosen based on the selection criteria by scanning
the publications' titles and abstracts; secondly, the documents
chosen in the initial phase were thoroughly read to create a
shortlist of articles published that would be chosen based on
the inclusion and exclusion criteria.
III. XAI BACKGROUND

FIGURE 4. Percentage of Papers included from 2011 to 2022.

As we introduced in Section I, the concept of XAI is defined
as the technique to improve the human understanding of how
AI makes decisions [10]. In this section, we will review the
general background of XAI, providing some necessary prior
knowledge for readers to have a better understanding in the
following sections introducing the XAI applications in cyber
security.

II. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

The research methodology flow chart of this survey is
described in Figure 2. As we mentioned in Section I
Introduction, the goal of this study was to investigate the
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FIGURE 5 A Venn Diagram showing the connections between words
used frequently in the XAI domain.

Before exploring the XAI background deeply, it is worth
mentioning and clarifying the terminologies in the XAI
domain. Numerous concepts and phrases, which include
intelligibility,
explainability,
transparency,
and
interpretability. have been used to characterize XAI recently
[40]. And the relationships between these terms are shown in
Figure 5. Among these terms, interpretability is defined as a
concept similar to explainability [41]. However, in recent
years, the terminology for the term “interpretability” has
shifted to information extraction rather than providing
explanations [42], meaning that the terms of interpretability
and explainability are becoming more diverse while still
intersecting with each other. Therefore, in this study, we
focus on the side of “explainability” in XAI whereas the
reviewed papers focusing on “intelligibility”, “transparency”,
and “intelligibility” parts would be extracted and excluded
according to their clutters with the concept of
“explainability”.
In the following subsections of this section, we will
introduce the background of XAI from different perspectives
respectively, including the motivations to integrate XAI into
cyber security, categorizations of XAI, and existing
challenges of XAI. The purpose of this section is to provide
readers with a general description of the XAI area so that
readers could have a deeper understanding of the parts of
XAI applications in cyber security.
A. MOTIVATIONS TO INTEGRATE XAI INTO CYBER
SECURITY

Given the constant growth in complexity and volume of
cyber attacks including malware, intrusion, and spam, coping
with them is becoming increasingly difficult [17]. According
to [43], conventional algorithms including rule-based
algorithms, statistics-based algorithms, and signature-based
approaches are utilized to detect intrusions in the cyber
security area. However, due to the growing amount of data
being communicated over the Internet and the emergency of
the new networking paradigms including the Internet of
Things (IoT), cloud computing, and fog/edge computing [44],

these traditional approaches have a low capacity to process
massive amounts of data and high computing costs [7].
On the other hand, Artificial intelligence works as one of
the foundational technologies of Industry 4.0 [31]. Therefore,
AI techniques including Machine Learning algorithms and
Deep Learning algorithms can play a significant part in the
provision of intelligent cyber security services and
management in recent years. For instance, Daniele et al. [17]
concluded the implementation of Machine Learning Methods
for malware analysis including malware detection, malware
similarity analysis, and malware category analysis. And
Donghwoon et al. [15] utilized Deep Learning-based
approaches to network anomaly detection and network traffic
analysis.
Nevertheless, due to the limitations of the AI-based
approaches, the applications of AI in the cyber security area
are facing challenges as well. For instance, the access to
cybersecurity-related data [45], adversarial attacks on AI
models [46], and Ethics and Privacy issues [47] are typical
inherent limitations suffered by AI-based cyber security
systems. Among these drawbacks, the black-box nature of AI
models is a severe limitation that we should pay more
attention to when AI models are integrated into the cyber
security domain [48]. Because of AI models’ black-box
characteristics, the cybersecurity-related decisions generated
by AI-based models lack rationale and justifiability of their
decisions and therefore are difficult for people to understand
how these results are produced [49]. In this case, the cyber
defensive mechanisms would become black-box systems that
are extremely vulnerable to information breaches and AIbased cyber threats [50].
Therefore, to deal with the drawbacks of utilizing AI for
cyber security, XAI is a reaction that emerged to the growing
black box issue with AI. Users and specialists can understand
the logical explanation and main data evidence due to XAI's
contribution of interoperability to the results produced by the
AI-based statistical models [19].
To conclude, the motivations to apply XAI to cyber
security are given as followings:
1) Building trust is a key object for integrating XAI
which is closely related to transparency and
understanding of cybersecurity-related decision
models.
2) Another motivation to apply XAI in the cyber
security area is to comply with many new
regulations and General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) laws [51] calling for providing
explanations to the entire society in various fields
including cyber security.
3) Justice, social responsibility, and risk mitigation are
significant concerns for applying XAI in cyber
security because protecting cyber security may be
dealing with serious social problems, sometimes
even human lives, and not just cost-benefit
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calculations.
4) Cyber security system biases and the
misunderstanding of their effectiveness have
emerged as key drivers for XAI. For instance,
biased training data occurs as a problem that affects
the model's output's credibility, in particular when
working with neural networks that learn patterns
from training data [52].
5) Ability to provide obliged and decent justification
for the cyber security system. By doing so, the
created cyber security defensive mechanisms can
not only be fair and socially responsible for the
decisions, but also defend their results with
justifications.
B. CATEGORIZATIONS OF XAI

According to [53], [54], the XAI categories can be structured
in a variety of aspects shown in Figure 6. It is noticeable that
the categorization methods are not ideal, meaning that
overlapping may happen and one specific XAI technique can
be categorized into one or more aspects. Therefore, it would
be more precise and concrete if we categorized one XAI
technique from different categorization perspectives. By
doing so, more information and characteristics of this XAI
approach could be revealed at different levels.
1) INTRINSIC OR POST-HOC

This categorization method distinguishes between achieving
explainability by limiting the complexity of the AI model
(intrinsic) or by analyzing the methodology of the model
after training (Post-hoc) to differentiate whether
explainability is achieved. An intrinsic XAI approach
produces the explanation concurrently with the forecast by
using data that the model emits as a result of the predictionmaking process [55]. Some Machine Learning models,
including Decision Trees and Sparse Linear models, are
regarded as intrinsic XAI approaches because they are selfexplained. On the other hand, Post-hoc explanations are the
utilization of interpretation methods after the models have
been trained and the decisions have already been made.
Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) [56]
and Permutation Importance [57] are typical Post-hoc
explanation methods working independently as an external
interpretable model.
2) MODEL-SPECIFIC OR MODEL-AGNOSTIC

XAI methods can also be classified according to the classes
of models to that XAI methods could be applied, which are
model-specific
or
model-agnostic.
Model-specific
explanation tools are specific to a single model or group of
models. For instance, the graph neural network explainer [58]
is a method for presenting comprehensible justifications for
any GNN-based model's predictions on any graph-based
machine learning problem. On the contrary, model-agnostic
explanation tools can be implemented with any machine
learning model in theory. Furthermore, model-agnostic

explanation methods usually work by analyzing feature
inputs and outputs and do not have access to the models’
internal information, such as weights or structural
information by definition. Shapley Additive Explanations
(SHAP) tools [59], Saliency Map [60], and Gradientweighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM) [61] are
widely used model-agnostic explanation tools.
3) LOCAL OR GLOBAL

Explanations of the decision models can be divided as local
or global depending on the model's scope. Local
explainability describes a system's capacity to show a user
why a particular choice or decision was made. Some popular
explainability methods such as LIME [56], SHAP [59], and
counterfactual explanations [62] can be filed under this
category. Local explainability methods are emphasized as the
first crucial component of model transparency [55]. In the
contrast, global explainability refers to the explanation of the
learning algorithm as a whole, taking into account the
training data utilized, the algorithms' proper applications, and
any cautions regarding the algorithm's flaws and improper
applications. Global Attribution Mapping (GAM) is
proposed in [63] as a global explaination approach to explain
the landscape of neural network predictions across
subpopulations.
4) EXPLANATION OUTPUT

The explanation output is also a crucial component of XAI
categorization for the reason that the format of the
explanation output would have a strong influence on certain
users. For instance, text-based explanation methods are
widely utilized in the field of Natural Language Processing
(NLP) to fine-grained information and generate humanreadable explanations [64]. On the hand, the visualized
explanation approaches are used in vaster domains including
NLP [65], neural networks [66], and healthcare [67]. In fact,
the majority of feature summary statistics can also be
visualized and some feature summaries are only meaningful
when visualized [68]. Arguments-based explanations involve
outlining the features in a way that humans use to come to
decisions to help humans to better understand the relevance
of a feature [69]. Model-based explanation approaches need
to outline the internal working logic of a black-box model.
And this is often accomplished by approximating the blackbox model behavior with a different model that is more
interpretable and transparent [10]. For instance, Wu et al. [70]
proposed a model-specific technique aiming to reduce the
complexity of the Deep Neural Network (DNN) model by
introducing a model complexity penalty function. And
Lakkaraju et al. [71] proposed a model-agnostic technique
called Model Understanding through Subspace Explanations
(MUSE), aiming at learning the behavious of a specific
black-box model by yielding a small number of tight decision
sets.
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FIGURE 6

An overview diagram showing the categorization of XAI in different aspects.

C. EXISTING CHALLENGES OF XAI

Despite the fact that the research community has regarded
XAI as a solution to the issues with the trust and dependency
posed by conventional black-box AI-based systems, XAI is
still facing challenges from different perspectives.
Challenges related to XAI security, XAI performance
evaluation, legal and privacy issues, and the trade-off
between interpretability and accuracy. In Table 3, a summary
of challenges related to these challenges of XAI is provided.
1) XAI SECURITY

Some frequently deployed XAI models are susceptible to
adversarial attacks, which raises the public’s concern about
the security of XAI [72].
Guo in [73] highlighted the necessity to develop defense
mechanisms that can recognize targeted attacks against XAI
engines, especially for the reason that building and
quantifying trust between human end-users is essential for
6G to enable higher levels of safety-critical autonomy across
a variety of industries. And Fatima et al. [74] also pointed
out that it would be fascinating to look into the adversarial
ML and DL models (or the application of ML and DL in
adversarial circumstances) in XAI and highlighted the three
main factors that enable the security of AI models are the
changes in the input data used by learning models, bias, and
fairness.
Slack et al. [75] made criticism about some post-hoc
explanation methods such as LIME and SHAP by

demonstrating that the extremely biased (racist) classifiers
crafted can easily fool these popular explanation techniques.
Besides, for the specific Deep Neural Network (DNN)
models, Cleverhans et al. [76] looked for adversarial
vulnerabilities DeepFool tool and offered several methods to
harden the model against it.
2) XAI PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

The effectiveness of an XAI method could be evaluated and
measured in a variety of ways. However, there is no accepted
system available for determining if an XAI system is more
user-intelligent than another XAI system at this time [77].
In papers [78] and [79], strong concerns were proposed
about choosing the best technique for explainability requires
a well-established evaluation system for explainability.
For the evaluation of the explanations given by post-hoc
XAI approaches on tabular data, Julian et al. [80] proposed a
definition of feature relevance in Boolean functions and a
testing environment by creating fictitious datasets. And in
paper [81], Leila et al. solved the issue of the absence of a
heatmap quality measurement that is both impartial and
widely acknowledged by presenting a framework for
evaluating XAI algorithms using ground truth based on the
CLEVR visual question answering task.
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TABLE 3. Summary of XAI challenges.

Challenges

XAI security

Reference

Descriptions

[73]

The necessity to develop defense mechanisms
against attacks especially for building 6G
industries.
The application of ML and DL in adversarial
circumstances. Be aware of the input data.
Criticized some post-hoc explanation
methods such as LIME and SHAP by fooling
these techniques.
Discussed the DeepFool tool targeting DNN
models and offered several methods against
it.
Outlined the fact that there is no accepted
system for determining the XAI system’s
priority.
Proposed strong concerns about choosing the
best technique for explainability
Proposed a definition of feature relevance in
Boolean functions and a testing environment
Presented a framework for evaluating XAI
algorithms based on the CLEVR visual
question answering task.
Proposed concerns about the role of XAI in
marketing AI applications.
The European Commission (EC) has also
published ethical guidelines for Trustworthy
AI and highlighted privacy.
GDPR of the EU outlined the human right to
contest the decision made and got an
explanation of the decision.
Discussed what degree people have a legal
right to an explanation of automated decisionmaking under EU law
Outlined the fact that the algorithms that
currently perform the best are frequently the
least explainable such as Deep Learning.
Pointed out that models’ explainability may
be compromised in cases when highly
engineered or heavy dimensional features are
used
Adopted a multidisciplinary approach to
analyze the relevance of explainability for
medical AI from different perspectives
Argued the necessity to apply XAI in clinical
practice

[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]

XAI performance
evaluation

[78]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]

Legal and privacy
issues

[84]
[85]

The trade-off
between
interpretability
and accuracy

[53]
[86]

[87]
[88]

3) LEGAL AND PRIVACY ISSUES

Besides the above described technical challenges, XAI faces
significant legal and privacy issues as well. In numerous
instances, including some well-known court cases, a history
of biased legal and privacy issues was made by XAI systems
[89].
Arun [82] proposed concerns about the role of XAI in
influencing the privacy calculus of individuals, especially the
privacy concerns of customers in marketing AI applications.
The European Commission (EC) has also published ethical
guidelines for Trustworthy AI as a legal document [83],
highlighting the respect for privacy, quality and integrity of
data, and access to data.
The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [84] of
the EU has added clarification to its information security

architecture. In Recital 71, the word ‘ ‘ explanation’’ is
mentioned, outlining the human right to contest the decision
made following such an evaluation and to get an explanation
of the decision. Furthermore, Martin [85] investigated
whether and to what degree people have a legal right to an
explanation of automated decision-making under EU law,
particularly when AI systems are involved.
4) THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN INTERPRETABILITY
AND ACCURACY

The Explainability and performance (predictive accuracy) of
a model are generally shown to be in trading-off with each
other [90]. In fact, there is a demand for explainable models
that can attain high performance because the algorithms that
currently perform the best are frequently the least explainable
(for example, deep learning) [53].
Despite simple models being frequently favored for their
ease of explaining [91], these models’ explainability may be
compromised in cases when highly engineered or heavy
dimensional features are used [86].
Amann et al. [87] adopted a multidisciplinary approach to
analyze the relevance of explainability for medical AI from
different perspectives, showing the necessity to apply XAI in
clinical practice even though the primary objective is to give
patients the finest care possible [88].
IV. XAI FRAMEWORK AND DATASETS FOR CYBER
SECURITY
A. XAI FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER SECURITY

In this section, based on the publications we have carefully
read in this survey, we provide a general XAI framework
diagram for cyber security applications. And the conceptual
framework diagram for XAI applications in cyber security is
illustrated in Figure 7. This diagram is considered to be as
general as it can be to show the processes of applying XAI in
the cyber area domains. There are several stages in this
workflow whereas certain sample instances are presented in
each stage.
The framework workflow starts by determining the types
of cyber security tasks, including malware detection, spam
detection, and fraud detection, which are defined by the types
of cyber attacks facing. The corresponding data such as
emails, network traffic, and application activities will be
collected and processed in the next stages. Then features
representing significant characteristics will be extracted and
fed to train different Artificial Intelligence models depending
on specific situations. Cyber security test samples will be
analyzed and made decisions after the models have been
trained. Users can get decisions and explanations explicitly
from self-interpretable models whereas the predictions made
by black-box modes require explanations of XAI models to
make the users requesting for the cyber security tasks
satisfied. It is noticeable that this diagram is only a general
workflow of XAI applied in cyber security areas, and the
details may differ for different tasks specifically.
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FIGURE 7

The conceptual framework diagram for XAI applications in cyber security.

B. CYBER SECURITY DATABASES

It is an undeniable fact that currently judicious selection and
use of data is a pretty significant presence for cyber security
research [92]. On the other hand, the quality and capacity of
data influence significantly the decisions of XAI models,
including Deep Learning-based models and Machine
Learning-based models as well. Although cyber security data
can be gathered straightforwardly by the use of numerous
methods, like using software tools like Win Dump or
Wireshark to capture network packets, these methods are
mainly targeted and appropriate for gathering narrow or low
volumes of data whereas high acquisition time and expenses
will be required [93]. Therefore, the utilization of benchmark
cyber security datasets can reduce the time spent on data
gathering and improve the effectiveness of research.
Researchers can train, verify, and evaluate XAI-based cyber
security solutions using these benchmark datasets. In this
section, we will introduce and describe the most significant
datasets employed in cyber security from perspectives of
different categories of the most prominent cyber attacks and
cyber security implementation in different industrial areas
respectively.

Table 4 shows the details of the frequently used public
accessible datasets in the context of cyber attacks including
malware, Botnet, spam, DGA, DoS, CPSs, phishing, and
network intrusion. It is noteworthy that there are some
overlappings because some datasets contain several
categories of cyber attacks.
On the other hand, Table 5 illustrates a comprehensive
overview of XAI applications for cyber security in distinct
industries including smart cities, healthcare, smart agriculture,
smart transportation, smart financial system, and HumanComputer Interaction(HCI). These industrial datasets can
show the potential of applying XAI for cyber security in
these domains.
V. XAI APPLICATIONS TO CYBER SECURITY

This section provides a comprehensive overview of XAI
applications in the areas of cyber security from different
viewpoints. We categorized these applications into 3 main
groups: defensive applications of XAI against cyber attacks,
potentials of XAI applications for cyber security in different
industries, and cyber adversarial threats targeting XAI
applications and defense approaches against these attacks.
Some important existing works under each of these domains
will be introduced in detail respectively.
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TABLE 4. Some public available datasets in the context of cyber attacks categories.

Cyber Attack
Categories Reference
[94]

Malware

Spam

Network
Intrusion

Botnet

DGA
Phishing
CPSs

DoS

Dataset Name

Cited
Number
Dataset Details
N- BaIoT
644 N-BaIoT contains real traffic (115 numerical features) of 9 commercial IoT devices infected with 2
IoT-based botnets, Mirai and BASHLITE.
[95]
IoTPOT
2016
219 500 IoT malware samples from four key families are included in IoTPOT, which was compiled via
an IoT honeypot. And these IoT devices were running on different CPU architectures such as ARM,
MIPS, and PPC.
[96]
IoT-23
2020
381 IoT-23 is a dataset of Internet of Things (IoT) device network traffic. In IoT devices, it has captured
20 malware executions and 3 benign IoT device traffic grabs.
[97]
EMBER
2018
223 EMBER includes features extracted from 1.1M binary files 200K test samples and 900K training
samples (300K harmful, 300K benign, and 300K unlabeled) (100K malicious, 100K benign).
[98] Genome Project
2012
2689 More than 1,200 malware samples covering the majority of the current Android malware families
were collected in this dataset and were systematically characterized from various aspects.
[99]
VirusShare
Updating N/A There are 48,195,237 samples of malware in the collection known as VirusShare. And it is
frequently utilized for malware analysis and detection and is primarily affected.
[100] CICAndMal201
2018
143 Created a new dataset called CI-CAndMal2017 and provide a methodical method to build Android
7
malware datasets using actual smartphones as opposed to emulators. More than 10,854 samples
(4,354 malware and 6,500 benign) were collected.
[101]
DREBIN
2014
2102 DREBIN performs a thorough static analysis of the Android platform to gather as many features of
an application as feasible. 5,560 applications from 179 different malware families were collected.
[102]
SMS Spam
2011
367 This dataset offered a new real, public, and non-encoded SMS spam collection.
v.1
[103]
EnronSpam
2006
743 The Enron Corpus is a database of over 600,000 emails generated by 158 employees of the Enron
Corporation.
[104] ISCX-URL2016 2016
100 Around 114,400 URLs were collected initially in this dataset containing benign and malicious
URLs in four categories: Spam, Malware, Phishing, and Defacement.
[105]
NSL-KDD
2009
3730 To solve the issues of the KDD data set, a new data set, NSL-KDD, is proposed, which consists of
selected records of the complete KDD data set.
[106] UNB ISCX 2012 2012
1027 The Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity at the University of New Brunswick (UNB) established
UNB ISCX 2012 in 2012. Over seven days, traffic was recorded in a simulated network
environment.
[107]
AWID
2016
365 A labeled dataset with an emphasis on 802.11 networks is called AWID [117. To collect WLAN
traffic in a packet-based format, a small network environment with 10 clients was created, and 15
distinct attacks were carried out.
[108] CIC-IDS2017
2018
1672 The CIC-IDS2017 dataset includes a variety of user-profiles (creating background traffic) and
multistage attacks such as Heartbleed and DDoS. Eighty traffic features were extracted using the
CICFlowMeter program.
[109] CIC-DDoS2019
2019
309 The CIC-DDoS2019 dataset contains a wide variety of DDoS assaults that were executed utilizing
TCP/UDP application layer protocols.
[110]
TON_IoT
2020
103 TON IoT dataset was constituted by the IoT traffic collected from a medium-scale network at the
Cyber Range and IoT Labs of the UNSW Canberra, Australia. Other types of IoT data include
operating system logs and telemetry data.
[111] LITNET-2020
2020
44 Feature vectors produced during 12 assaults on common computers installed on an academic
network are included in the LITNET-2020 dataset.
[112]
ADFA-LD
2013
281 The ADFA-LD12 represents a worthy successor to the KDD collection. The most recent publicly
accessible exploits and techniques are used with a contemporary Linux operating system for this
new dataset.
[113] UNSW-NB15
2015
1419 This dataset contains two label attributes: the first label specifies the attack, while the second label
is binary. It also has 49 characteristics. This dataset takes into account assaults such as worms,
backdoors, shellcode, DoS assaults, generic assaults, exploits, and analysis assaults.
[114]
CTU-13
2014
606 Raw pcap files for malicious, typical, and background data are included in the CTU-13 dataset. In
this dataset, the unidentified traffic is coming from a sizable network, the botnet attacks are real,
meaning that it is not a simulated dataset.
[108] CIC-IDS2017
2018
1672 The CIC-IDS2017 dataset includes a variety of user-profiles (creating background traffic) and
multistage attacks such as Heartbleed and DDoS. Eighty traffic features were extracted using the
CICFlowMeter program.
[115] ISOT Botnet
2011
325 The ISOT HTTP botnet dataset consists of two traffic captures malignant DNS information for nine
Dataset
different botnets and benign DNS information for 19 different well-known software programs. And
the ISOT dataset is the combination of several existing publicly available malicious and nonmalicious datasets.
[116]
BOT-IOT
2019
526 The proposed BOT-IOT Dataset is made up of three parts: network platforms, fictitious IoT
Dataset
services, and features extraction and forensic analytics.
[98] Genome Project
2012
2689 More than 1,200 malware samples covering the majority of the current Android malware families
were collected in this dataset and were systematically characterized from various aspects.
[117]
UMUDGA
2020
25 Proposed a comprehensive, labeled dataset with over 30 million AGDs arranged into 50 groups of
malware variants that are ready for machine learning.
[118] AmritaDGA
2019
16 AmritaDGA is made up of two data sets. The first data collection is gathered from sources that are
openly accessible. The second set of information is gathered from a private real-time network.
[104] ISCX-URL2016 2016
100 Around 114,400 URLs were collected initially in this dataset containing benign and malicious
URLs in four categories: Spam, Malware, Phishing, and Defacement.
[119] HAI Dataset 1.0
2020
25 The HAI dataset was collected from a realistic industrial control system (ICS) testbed augmented
with a Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) simulator that emulates steam-turbine power generation and
pumped-storage hydropower generation.
[120] Power System
2014
248 This dataset consists of three datasets that measure the normal, disturbed, controlled, and
Attack Datasets
cyberattack behaviors of the electric transmission system. The collection contains measurements
from relays, a simulated control panel, synchrophasor measurements, and data logs from Snort.
[121] InSDN Dataset
2020
50 A variety of attack types, including DoS, DDoS, Web, Password-Guessing, and Botnets, are
included in the InSDN dataset.
[106] UNB ISCX 2012 2012
1027 The Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity at the University of New Brunswick (UNB) established
UNB ISCX 2012 in 2012. Over seven days, traffic was recorded in a simulated network
environment.
Year
2018
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TABLE 5. Some public available datasets in the context of distinct industries.

Different
Industry
Verticals

Reference

Dataset Name

[122]

PPMI

2011

[123]

CoAID

2020

[124]

Healthcare

Heart Disease
Cleveland UCI
[125]
MIMIC-III

2020

[126]

MIMIC-II

2011

[127]

PTB-XL

2020

[128]

BreakHis

2016

[129]

CPSC2018

2018

Smart Cities

Smart
Agriculture

HCI

Smart
Financial
System

2016

[130] REMBRANDT

2018

[131]

GlioVis

2016

[132]

Cologne
Vehicular
mobility trace
PKLot

2013

[133]
Smart
Transportation

Year

2015

[134] PEMS-SF Data
Set

2011

[135] CNRPark+EXT

2017

[136]

VED

2020

[137]

T-Drive

2011

[138]

GeoLife GPS
Trajectories

2009

[139]

KITTI

2013

[140] Images on plant
health
[141]
PS-Plant

2015

[142] Plant Pathology

2020

[143]

Clarkson

2015

[144]

Torino

2005

[145]

Buffalo

2016

2019

[146] Nielsen Dataset

2017

[147] Statlog (German
Credit Data)
Data Set

1994

Cited
Number

Dataset Details

1059 The PPMI dataset will include 200 healthy volunteers and 400 recently diagnosed PD patients who
will be followed longitudinally for clinical, imaging, and biospecimen biomarker assessment at 21
clinical sites utilizing standardized data gathering techniques.
133 This dataset included bogus news on websites and social media platforms, as well as consumers'
social engagement with such material. CoAID (Covid-19 heAlthcare mIsinformation Dataset)
featured a variety of COVID-19 healthcare misinformation. CoAID has 4,251 news items, 296,000
user interactions, 926 posts on social media sites regarding COVID-19, and ground truth labels.
27 The Heart Disease Cleveland UC Irvine dataset uses 13 factors to predict whether or not a person
has heart disease. Reprocessing was done using the 76 feature original dataset.
4140 MIMIC-III (‘Medical Information Mart for Intensive Care’) is a sizable, single-center database that
contains data on people who have been admitted to tertiary care hospitals' critical care units.
1104 There were 25,328 stays in intensive care units in the MIMIC-II database. Laboratory data,
therapeutic intervention profiles like vasoactive medication drip rates and ventilator settings,
nursing progress notes, discharge summaries, radiology reports, and provider order entry data were
all collected by the researchers during their detailed examination of intensive care unit patient stays.
171 This 10-second-long 12-lead ECG-waveform dataset has 21837 records from 18885 patients. Up to
two cardiologists annotated the ECG waveform data as a multi-label dataset with diagnostic labels
further grouped into super and subclasses.
725 BreakHis was composed of 9,109 microscopic images of breast tumor tissue collected from 82
patients using different magnifying factors (40X, 100X, 200X, and 400X). To date, it contains
2,480 benign and 5,429 malignant samples
204 One normal ECG type and eight abnormal ECG types are part of the data utilized in
dataset CPSC2018. This study describes the data source, recording details, and clinical baseline
characteristics of patients, such as age, gender, and so on. It also describes the typical procedures
for detecting and categorizing the aberrant ECG patterns mentioned above.
90 The 671 cases in the Rembrandt brain cancer dataset were gathered from 14 collaborating
institutions between 2004 and 2006. It is available for use with the Georgetown Database of Cancer
(G-DOC) open access platform for undertaking clinical translational research.
446 GlioVis contains over 6500 tumor samples of approximately 50 expression datasets of a large
collection of brain tumor entities (mostly gliomas), both adult and pediatric.
327 During 700.000 individual car excursions are included in the resultant synthetic trace of the car
traffic in the city of Cologne, which spans a 400 square kilometer area over the course of a normal
working day.
227 695,899 photos from two parking lots were collected for this new parking lot dataset using three
different camera perspectives. The acquisition methodology enables the collection of static
photographs illustrating variations in illumination on sunny, cloudy, and wet days.
362 This dataset describes the various car lanes on the motorways in the San Francisco Bay area's
occupancy rate, which ranges from 0 to 1. Every ten minutes, samples are taken from the
measurements, which span the period from January 1st 2008 to March 30th 2009.
282 The CNRPark+EXT dataset, which was created on a parking lot with 164 spaces, has around
150,000 annotated pictures (patches) of vacant and occupied parking places.
24 This open dataset records the GPS positions of moving objects combined with time-series data on
their consumption of fuel, energy, speed, and auxiliary power. Between November 2017 and
November 2018, a diversified fleet of 264 gasoline vehicles, 92 HEVs, and 27 PHEV/EVs were on
the road. The data were gathered using onboard OBD-II recorders. The types of driving situations
and seasons range from highways to congested city areas.
826 The dataset tracks 10357 taxi movements in Beijing over the course of one week, from February 2
to February 8, 2008. Using longitude and latitude, this data displays the location of a cab
continuously throughout a range of time periods.
2328 The dataset captured a trajectory position that tracks 182 mobile users in Beijing, China, over the
course of three years, from April 2007 to October 2011. Over 48,000 hours and nearly 1.2 million
kilometers are covered throughout the complete journey.
5831 A cutting-edge dataset obtained from a Volkswagen station wagon for use in studies on mobile
robotics and autonomous driving. a range of sensor modalities, including high-resolution color and
grayscale stereo cameras, a Velodyne 3D laser scanner, and a high-precision GPS/IMU inertial
navigation system, were used to record 6 hours' worth of traffic scenarios at 10-100 Hz in total.
550 Through the current web platform PlantVillage, this dataset made available over 50,000 highly
curated photos of healthy and diseased leaves of crop plants.
36 Presented PS-Plant, a low-cost and portable 3D plant phenotyping platform based on an imaging
technique novel to plant phenotyping called photometric stereo (PS).
14 3,651 high-quality, realistic photos showing the symptoms of various apple foliar diseases were
recorded in this collection, together with variations in noise, illumination, angles, and surfaces. The
Kaggle community was given access to a subset that had been expertly annotated to provide a
prototype dataset for apple scab, cedar apple rust, and healthy leaves.
73 This dataset offered a brand-new keystroke dataset that includes 39 users' transcribed text, free text,
and short sentences. This dataset can be used to recreate the authentication performance that was
seen in earlier studies. However, all participants are required to complete the same set of
predetermined activities in a university lab using the same HTML form and desk-top computer.
607 Although the Orino dataset is similarly gathered using a predefined HTML form, participants are
free to use any keyboard and complete their tasks at home rather than in a lab.
51 This dataset included unprocessed keystroke data from 157 participants who were permitted to
freely transcribe fixed text and respond to questions. The dataset is designed to capture the temporal
changes in typing habits as well as the disruptions brought on by various keyboard layouts.
32 This information was gathered between 2006 and 2010 at 35,000 participating mass merchandisers,
pharmacies, and grocery stores spread over 55 MSA (metropolitan statistical areas) in the United
States.
N/A The German Credit Data provides information on 20 criteria and classification of 1000 loan
applicants as either Good or Bad Credit Risks. Also comes with a cost matrix.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Access. This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3204051

FIGURE 8

The overview of some common types of cyber attacks.

A. XAI APPLICATIONS IN DEFENDING AGAINST
CYBER ATTACKS

XAI is playing an increasingly significant role in fighting a
wide range of cyber attacks, as shown in Figure 8. In this
subsection, we analyzed the state-of-art XAI-based defense
systems for different categories of cyber attacks. And the
conjunctions of these systems with XAI topologies are
shown in Table 6 as well.
1) MALWARE

One of the major cyber security risks on the Internet today is
malware, and implementing effective defensive measures
necessitates the quick analysis of an ever-growing volume of
malware quantities [148]. Existing techniques for malware
detection can be categorized into two main types: Static
detection and Dynamic detection [149]. Static malware
detection analyzes the malware binary without actually
running the code. Instead, the decompilation tool is utilized
to obtain the decompiled codes and the included instructions
are inspected. However, this kind of strategy can be easily
countered by using evading methods like obscuring and
incorporating syntax flaws. On the other hand, dynamic
malware detection entails executing the malware codes on
the testing system and monitoring how it behaves.
In practice, using these conventional malware detection
techniques and manually analyzing every malware file in an

application takes a lot of time and resources. Therefore,
many AI-based malware detection systems, especially DL
algorithms are utilized to detect malware with higher better
performance and fewer resources than traditional malware
detecting methods [150]. However, the working functions of
neural networks are similar to a black box, and this topology
offers no indication of how it operates [151]. Due to similar
motivations, many researchers deploy different categories of
XAI approaches in different degrees to make the AI-based
malware detection systems more explainable and transparent
so that a reliable malware detector can continue to perform
well when deployed to a new environment.
There are multiple ways to explain the malware detector.
Identifying the most significant local features can always
provide valuable explanations for malware detection
decisions. Marco et al. [152] implemented a gradient-based
approach to identify the most influential features contributing
to each decision. A popular Android malware detector named
Drebin [153] extracted the information from the Android
applications. The explainabilities of Drebin on non-linear
algorithms, including Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and
Random Forests (RFs) are retained by both local
explanations and global explanations. The top 10 important
features, sorted by their applicability values are disclosed for
3 different cases whereas the AUC remains above 0.96.
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For neural network-based detecting mechanisms, Shamik
et al. [154] proposed a framework explaining how a deep
neural network generalizes real-world testing set in different
layers. The gradients and weights of different layers of the
MalConv architecture [155] and emberMalConv [156] are
analyzed to identify different parts’ contributions to the
classification. High gradient values were found in the header
of the files while there are peaks elsewhere, demonstrating
that these parts are mostly responsible for classification
results. Besides, two filters A and B learned two different
sets of features, the accuracy and F1-Score can achieve
91.2% and 90.7% respectively when model B was replaced
by model A.
Hamad et al. [157] developed a pre-trained Inception-v3
CNN-based transfer learned model to analyze malware in
IoT devices. To better understand the features learned by the
CNN models, Gradient weighted class activation mapping
(Grad-CAM) is utilized to generate cumulative heatmaps and
explain the models visually. Besides, t-distributed stochastic
neighbor embedding (t-SNE) is used to verify the density of
the features in the proposed CNN models. Achieved by the
suggested methods, the detection accuracies were 98.5% and
96.9% on the available testing dataset with SoftMax
classifier and RF classifier respectively.
Anli et al. [158] suggested a technique for extracting rules
from a deep neural network so that the rules can be used to
identify mobile malware behaviors. To represent the rules
discovered between the inputs and outputs of each hidden
layer in the deep neural network, an input-hidden tree and a
single hidden-output tree for each hidden layer were
established. Then the hidden-output tree can tell the most
important hidden layer which could specify the related inputhidden tree. The experimental results illustrated accuracy,
precision, recall, and F-Measure of the proposed method
were 98.55%, 97.93%, 98.27%, and 98.04% respectively.
Giacomo et al. [159] offered a way for assessing deep
learning models for malware classification using image data.
It uses data from a Grad-CAM and makes an effort to extend
the evaluation of the training phase of the models being
studied and provide visual information to security analysts.
Besides, this technique extends the use of the Grad-CAM and,
in addition to the cumulative heatmap, automates the analysis
of the heatmaps, assisting security analysts in debugging the
model without having any prior knowledge of the
issue/pattern in question. Over a testing dataset of more than
8,000 samples classified into 7 families, the proposed model
tested in the experimental study had a test accuracy of 97%.
However, the limitation of this approach is the morphed
version of the malicious sample belonging to the family can
evade antimalware detection.
TrafficAV, an effective and explainable detection
framework of mobile malware behavior using network traffic
was proposed by Shanshan et al. [160]. This framework
provided explainability to users by defining four sets for each
feature extracted from the malware HTTP request and every

decision would be distributed certain values to each set
respectively, showing the contribution of different sets of
features to the detection results. The detection rates of TCP
flow and HTTP models reach 98.16% and 99.65% while the
false positive rates are 5.14% and 1.84%.
An explainable fast, and accurate approach for detecting
Android malware called PAIRED was illustrated by
Mohammed et al. in [161]. The proposed detection system
achieved lightweight by reducing the number of features by a
factor of 84% and deploying classifiers that are not resourceintensive. 35 static features were extracted and explained
later by SHAP methods. In the experiment, PAIRED
malware detection system was able to retain a very high
accuracy of 97.98% while processing data in just 0.8206µs
by testing with the CICMalDroid2020 dataset with the
extracted 35 features.
Martin et al. [162] presented a novel way to find locations
in an Android app's opcode sequence that the CNN model
considered crucial and that might help with malware
detection. CNN was demonstrated to assign a high priority in
locations similar to those highlighted by LIME as the stateof-the-art for highlighting feature relevance on the
benchmark Drebin [101] dataset. And satisfying
experimental results were produced as well, including
accuracy = 0.98, precision =0.98, recall = 0.98, and F1-Score
= 0.97.
2) SPAM

Due to the increasing number of Internet users, spam has
become a major problem for Internet users in recent years
[163]. According to [164], while over 306.4 billion emails
were sent and received per day in 2021, spam emails
accounted for more than 55 percent of all emails sent in 2021,
meaning that unsolicited email messages accounted for
nearly half of all email traffic.
Recently, AI-based systems can be regarded as an efficient
option to tackle the spam issue primarily because of their
ability to evolve and tune themselves [165]. However, due to
the privacy and legal specialties of spam, users can ask many
questions about AI models, especially the black-box ML and
DL models [166]. For instance, a curious spam recipient can
have an interest in understanding the utilized AI models and
ask the following questions:
1) Why is Message classified as spam by Model?
2) What distinguishes spam from no spam?
3) How does Model distinguish spam from no spam?
4) How does Model work distinguishing an alternative
spam filter Model′ used in the past?
5) How does Model work?
These proposed questions can be answered by the
implementation of XAI algorithms and XAI algorithms
can be used to complement ML models with desired
properties, such as explainability and transparency [167].
And many works of literature have studied this area to
enhance the trust of the AI-based spam filters.
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Julio et al. [168] conducted a highly exploratory
investigation on fake spam news detection with ML
algorithms from a large and diverse set of features. SHAP
method was deployed to explain why some are classified
as fake news whereas others are not by representative
models of each cluster. Novel features related to the source
domain of the fake news are proposed and demonstrated
five times more frequencies appeared in the detection
models than in other features. Besides, only 2.2 percent of
the models have a detection performance higher than 0.85
in terms of AUC, which highlights how difficult it is to
identify bogus news.
The legally required trade-off between accuracy and
explainability was discussed and demonstrated in the
context of spam classification by Philipp et al. in [169] as
well. A dataset of 5574 SMS messages [170] was used to
support the argument that it is equally important to select
the appropriate model for the task at hand in addition to
concentrating on making complex models understandable.
In this work, under circumstances, that which just a small
quantity of annotated training data is available, very
simple models, such as Naive Bayes, can outperform more
complicated models, such as Random Forests.
HateXplain, a benchmark dataset for hate speech spam
that considers bias and explainability from many angles
was introduced by Binny et al. in [171]. Several models
including CNN-GRU [172], BiRNN [173], and BiRNNAttention [174] were used and tested on this dataset
whereas explainability-based metrics such as IntersectionOver-Union (IOU), comprehensiveness, and sufficiency
were utilized to evaluate the model interpretability.
Experimental results showed that models that succeed at
classification may not always be able to explain their
conclusions in a way that is believable and accurate. The
limitations behind this benchmark dataset are that external
contexts that would be relevant to the classification task,
such as the profile bio, user gender, and post history were
not considered and the proposed dataset contained English
language only.
3) BOTNET

A botnet attack is known as a group of connected computers
working together to carry out harmful and repetitive actions
to corrupt and disrupt the resources of a victim, such as
crashing websites [175]. As shown in Figure 9, a typical
botnet’s lifecycle contains 5 phases, including Initial
Injection, Secondary Injection, Connection, Malicious
Activities, and Maintenance and Updating.
The market for global botnet detection is anticipated to
expand from US$207.4 million in 2020 to US$965.6 million
in 2027, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 24.0
percent from 2021 to 2027, according to [176]. And Imperva
Research Labs [177] also found that botnets constituted 57%
of all attacks against e-commerce websites in 2021. These
statistics indicate that developing AI-based systems for
detecting botnets is necessary. Besides, XAI can contribute to

the botnet detecting systems’ trust and prevent automation
bias when users have too much trust in the systems’ output.
In [178], HATMA et al. proposed a novel model for
botnet DGA detection. Five Machine Learning algorithms
were utilized and tested with datasets of 55 botnet families.
Random Forest achieved the best accuracy of 96.3% and
outperformed previous works as well. Open-source
intelligence (OSINT) and XAI techniques including SHAP
and LIME were combined in this work to provide an antidote
for skepticism toward the model’s output and enhance the
system trust. Besides, the limitations of the proposed
frameworks were the temporal complexity involved in
calculating the characteristics and the model's low resistance
to Mask botnet assaults.
Shohei et al. [179] presented a novel two-step clustering
approach based on DBSCAN to cluster botnets and classify
their categories. Important features were represented and
explained by combining subspace clustering and frequent
pattern mining from 2 different real-world flow datasets:
MAWI [180] and ISP. 60 bot groups from 61,167 IP
addresses were categorized from the MAWI dataset whereas
295 bot groups from 408,118 IP addresses from the ISP
dataset. And the cluster results of botnets were self-explained
by using a dendrogram.
Visualization tools are also used to give better
explanations about the reasons for labeling an account as
botnet or legitimate. Michele et al. [181] suggested ReTweetTweet (RTT), a small but informative scatterplot
representation to make it simpler to explore a user's
retweeting activities. While the proposed botnet detection
method Retweet-Buster (RTbust) based on Variational
autoencoders (VAEs) and long short-term memory (LSTM)
network unsupervised feature extraction approaches were
utilized in a black-box nature, the visualization tool RTT can
still be employed economically after RTbust has been
applied to comprehend the traits of those accounts that have
been classified as bots.
Some researchers suggested the necessity to reduce the
number of the required features for botnet classification to
overcome the scalability and computation resource problems
and provide more reliable explanations in botnet detection
systems. In [182], Hayretdin et al. utilized Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) for feature dimension reduction
Decision Tree classifier preserved the original features and
clearly illustrated how the classifier determined the labels.
Therefore, An analyst for cyber security can quickly
comprehend an attack or typical behavior and utilize this
understanding to further interpret a security event or incident.
With the rise of deep learning (DL), several pilot studies
have been created to understand the behavior of botnet traffic.
However, It is difficult for users to understand and put their
trust in the outcomes of present DL models because of neural
networks’ poor decision-making and lack of transparency
compared to other approaches. To address this issue, Partha
et al. [183] carried out in-depth tests using both synthetic and
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FIGURE 9

The typical lifecycle of a botnet.

actual network traffic produced by the IXIA BreakingPoint
System and the results showed that the proposed DCNN
botnet detection models outperformed the existing machine
learning models with an improvement of up to 15% for all
performance metrics while SHAP was deployed to provide a
clear explanation of the model decision and gain the trust of
the end users.
BotStop, a packet-based and ML-based botnet detection
solution aimed at testing the incoming and outgoing network
traffic in an IoT device to stop botnet infections, was
introduced by Mohammed in [184]. The suggested method
additionally emphasized feature selection to utilize only
seven features to train an extremely accurate machine
learning classifier. The trained classifier surpassed all
methods from similar work with an accuracy of 0.9976, an
F1-Score of 0.9968, and a testing duration of 0.2250 μs.
Besides, very low FN and FP rates of 0.21 percent and 0.31
percent were attained using the suggested approach as well.
SHAP explanation is used to explain the proposed model to
make the classifier prediction process transparent.
4) FRAUD

According to [185], during the tightest periods of the
lockdown during the Covid-19 epidemic, there were
observed rises in personal account hacking and online
financial fraud. In the UK, fraud costs businesses and
individuals £130 billion per year, while it costs the
worldwide economy $3.89 trillion [186]. Therefore, to deal
with this issue, numerous financial services, have the
potential to benefit from the use of AI systems to defend
against fraud attacks. However, there are still practical
challenges with the complete implementation of AI methods,
and some focus on comprehending and being able to explain
the judgments and predictions produced by complicated
models by XAI [187].
Ismini et al. [187] investigated explanations for fraud
detection by both supervised and unsupervised models using
two of the most used techniques, LIME and SHAP. The open
source IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset [188] was tested
on 8 popular supervised and unsupervised AI models

including Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree,
Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, Neural Network,
Autoencoder, and Isolation Forest whereas LIME and SHAP
provided explanations for the detection results of each model
respectively. It was noticed that while SHAP gives more
reliable explanations, LIME is faster. Therefore, this paper
suggested that combining the two approaches may be
advantageous, with SHAP being used to facilitate regulatory
compliance and LIME being used to offer real-time
explanations for fraud prevention and model accuracy
analysis.
David et al. [189] investigated how existing XAI
algorithms may be used to explain specific predictions for
prescriptive solutions and derive more information about the
causes of cyber-fraud in the iGaming industry. Machine
Learning algorithms including RF, LGB, DT, and LR were
utilized to analyze a dataset with a sample size of 197,733.
Besides, this study also proved the existence of data drift and
suggested monthly retraining for the model to remain
consistently updated. Furthermore, to identify the features
that contributed most significantly to that particular case and
to quantify that same contribution, this study employed
locally faithful explanations. These explanations take the
form of mathematical inequalities that reflect feature
conditions, and each condition is assigned a relative strength.
One of the research’s limitations would be the manually
labeled dataset, which could have added bias and human
error to our analysis.
XFraud, an explainable fraud transaction prediction
framework composed of a detector and an explainer, was
presented by Susie et al. in [190]. A heterogeneous GNN
model for transaction fraud detection was proposed and
tested on industrial-scale datasets. Heterogeneity in
transaction graphs was captured whereas the presented
methodology outperformed previous models HGT [191] and
GEM [192]. Besides, the weights learned by the
GNNExplainer and the edge weights calculated using
centrality measures were compared and traded off to
compute a hybrid explainer in XFraud. The computed hybrid
XFraud explainer calculated the contributions of its
surrounding node types and edges and also paid attention to
global topological aspects discovered by centrality metrics.
XAI methods can also be utilized to improve the
performance of the fraud detection models. In [193],
Khushnaseeb et al. proposed SHAP_Model based on the
autoencoder for network fraud detection using SHAP values,
implemented in a subset of the CICIDS2017 dataset and
achieved overall accuracy and AUC of 94% and 96.9%
respectively. The top 30 features with the highest SHAP
values, playing a more significant role in causing abnormal
behavior in fraud detection than any other features, were
employed to build the SHAP_Model. Experimental results
demonstrated that the SHAP_Model outperformed the model
based on all features and the model based on 39features
extracted by unsupervised learning.
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Yongchun et al. [194] proposed a Hierarchical Explainable
Network (HEN) to represent user behavior patterns, which
could help with fraud detection while also making the
inference process more understandable. Furthermore, a
transfer framework was suggested for knowledge transfer
from source domains with sufficient and mature data to the
target domain to address the issue of cross-domain fraud
detection.
A novel fraud detection algorithm called FraudMemory
was proposed in [195] by Kunlin et al. This methodology
used memory networks to enhance both performance and
interpretability while using a novel sequential model to
capture the sequential patterns of each transaction. Besides,
memory components were incorporated in FraudMemory to
possess high adaptability to the existence of the concept drift.
The precision and AUC of the FraudMemory model were
0.968 and 0.969 respectively and performed better than any
other methods for comparison including SVM, DNN, RF,
and GRU.
Based on a real-world dataset and a simulated dataset,
Zhiwen and Jianbin [196] proposed an explainable
classification approach within the multiple instance learning
(MIL) framework that deployed the AP clustering method in
the self-training LSTM model to obtain a precise explanation.
The experimental results indicated that the presented
methodology surpassed the other 3 benchmark classifiers
including AP, SVM, and RF in both 2 datasets. Only a few
classification methods that can produce a straightforward
casual explanation is the one used in this study.
Wei et al. [197] proposed a Deep Learning-based behavior
representation framework for clustering to detect fraud in
financial services, called FinDeepBehaviorCluster. Time
attention-based Bi-LSTM was used to learn the embedding
of behavior sequence data whereas handcrafted features were
deployed to provide explanations. Then a GPU-optimized
HDBSCAN algorithm called pHDBSCAN is used for
clustering transactions with similar behaviors. The proposed
pHDBSCAN has demonstrated comparable performance to
the original HBDSCAN in experiments on two real-world
transaction data sets but with hundreds of times greater
computation efficiency.
5) PHISHING

Phishing refers to fake email messages that look to be sent by
a well-known company. The intention is to either download
malicious software onto the victim's computer or steal
sensitive data from it, including credit card numbers and
login credentials. Phishing is a form of online fraud that is
gaining popularity [198].
Yidong et al. [199] proposed a multi-modal hierarchical
attention model (MMHAM) that, for phishing website
detection, jointly learned the deep fraud cues from the three
main modalities of website content including URLs, text, and
image. Extracted features from different contents would be
aligned representations in the attention layer. This
methodology is self-explained because content distributed

with the most attention would be regarded as the most
important content contributing to the final decision.
Paulo et al. [200] utilized LIME and EBM explanation
techniques based on malicious URLs for a phishing
experiment on a publicly available dataset Ebbu2017 [201].
EBM, Random Forest, and SVM classifiers rated accuracy of
0.9646, 0.9732, and 0.9469 respectively on the tested
database. The empirical evidence supported that the models
could accurately categorize URLs as phishing or legitimate,
and they also added explainability to these machine learning
models, improving the final classification outcome.
Visual explanations of the phishing detection system
attracted attention in the work of Yun et al. [202] as well.
The proposed phishing website detection method Phishpedia
solved the challenging issues of logo detection and brand
recognition in phishing website detection. Both high
accuracy and little runtime overhead are attained via
Phishpedia. And most crucially, unlike conventional methods
such as EMD, PhishZoo, and LogoSENSE, Phishpedia does
not demand training on any specific phishing samples.
Moreover, Phishpedia was implemented with the CertStream
service, and in just 30 days, we found 1,704 new genuine
phishing websites, far more than other solutions. In addition,
1,133 of these were not flagged by any engines in VirusTotal.
Rohit et al. [203] proposed an anti-phishing method that
utilizes persuasion cues and investigated the effectiveness of
persuasion cues. Three machine learning models were
developed with pertinent gain persuasion cues, loss
persuasion cues, and combined gain and loss persuasion cues,
respectively, to respond to the research questions. We then
compare the results with a baseline model that does not take
the persuasion cues into account. The findings demonstrate
that the three phishing detection models incorporating
pertinent persuasion cues considerably outperform the
baseline model in terms of F1-score by a range of 5% to 20%,
making them effective tools for phishing email detection. In
addition, the use of the theoretical perspective can aid in the
creation of models that are comprehensible and can
understand black-box models.
6) NETWORK INTRUSION

An unauthorized infiltration into a computer in your
company or an address in your designated domain is referred
to as a network intrusion. On the other hand, Network
Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) are defined as
monitoring network or local system activity for indications of
unusual or malicious behavior that violates security or
accepted practices [36]. Recently, many works have adopted
ML and DL algorithms for building efficient NIDSs. In
addition, cyber security experts also consider introducing
explainability to the black-box AI systems to make the
NISDs more robust and many have tried with XAI [204].
Pieter et al. [204] proposed a two-staged pipeline for
robust network intrusion detection, which deployed XGBoost
in the first phase and Autoencoder in the second phase.
SHAP method was implemented to explain to the first stage
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model whereas the explanation results were utilized in the
second stage to train the autoencoder. Experiments in the
public corpus NSL-KDD [105] showed that the proposed
pipeline can outperform many state-of-the-art efforts in terms
of accuracy, recall, and precision with 93.28%, 97.81%, and
91.05% respectively on the NSL-KDD dataset while adding
an extra layer of explainability.
ROULETTE, an explainable network intrusion detection
system for neural attention multi-output classification of
network traffic data was introduced by Giuseppina et al. in
[205]. Experimentations were performed on two benchmark
datasets, NSL-KDD [105] and UNSW-NB15 [113] to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed neural model
with attention. The additional attention layer enables users to
observe specific network traffic characteristics that are most
useful for identifying particular intrusion categories. Two
heatmaps depicting the ranked average feature relevance of
the flow characteristics in the attention layer of the above 2
datasets were provided to show the explanation.
Zakaria et al. [206] designed a novel Deep Learning and
XAI-based system for intrusion detection in IoT networks.
Three different explanation methods including LIME, SHAP,
and RuleFit were deployed to provide local and global
explanations for the single output of the DNN model and the
most significant features conducted to the intrusion detection
decision respectively. Experiments were operated on NSLKDD [105] and UNSW-NB15 [113] datasets and the
performance results indicated the proposed framework's
effectiveness in strengthening the IoT IDS's interpretability
against well-known IoT assaults and assisting cybersecurity
professionals in better comprehending IDS judgments.
Yiwen et al. [207] presented an intrusion detection system
aimed at detecting malicious traffic intrusion in networks
such as flood attacks and Ddos attacks. This method was
XAI-based and deployed both neural networks and tree
models. It is noticeable that this approach decreased the
number of convolution layers in the neural work to enhance
the model’s explainability whereas the accuracy performance
of the model was not sacrificed. XGBoost was implemented
to process the prediction outputs of the neural network and
the processed results would be fed to LIME and SHAP for
further explanations.
A novel intrusion detection system known as BiLSTMXAI was presented by S. Sivamohan et al. in [208]. Krill
herd optimization (KHO) algorithm was implemented to
generate the most significant features of two network
intrusion datasets, NSL-KDD [105] and Honeypot [209], to
reduce the complexities of BiLSTM model and thus enhance
the detection accuracy and explainability. The obtained
detection rate of Honeypot is 97.2% and the NSL-KDD
dataset is 95.8% which was superior and LIME and SHAP
were deployed to explain the detection decisions.
Hong et al. [210] suggested a network intrusion detection
framework called FAIXID making use of XAI and data
cleaning techniques to enhance the explainability and

understandability of intrusion detection alerts. The proposed
framework will help cyber analysts make better decisions
because false positives will be quickly eliminated. Five
functional modules were identified in FAIXID framework:
the pre-modeling explainability model, the modeling module,
the post-modeling explainability module, the attribution
module, and the evaluation module. XAI algorithms
including Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA), Boolean Rule
Column Generation(BRCG), and Contrastive Explanations
Method (CEM) were deployed in the pre-modeling
explainability model, the modeling module, and the postmodeling explainability module respectively to provide
cybersecurity analysts comprehensive and high-quality
explanations about the detection decisions made by the
framework. On the other hand, collecting analysts’ feedback
through the evaluation module to enhance the explanation
models by data cleaning also proved effective in this work as
well.
Shraddha et al. [211] proposed a system where the
relations between features and system outcome, instancewise explanations, and local and global explanations aid to
get relevant features in decision making were identified to
help users to comprehend the patterns that the model has
learned by looking at the generated explanations. If the
learned patterns are incorrect, they can alter the dataset or
choose a different set of features to ensure that the model
learns the correct patterns. XAI methods including SHAP,
LIME, Contrastive Explanations Method (CEM), ProtoDash,
and Boolean Decision Rules via Column Generation (BRCG)
were implemented at different stages of the framework so
that the neural network not being a black box. The
experiment was performed on the dataset NSL-KDD [105]
and the proposed framework was applied to generate
explanations from different perspectives.
The Decision Tree algorithm was utilized by Basim et al.
in [212] to enhance trust management and was compared
with other Machine Learning algorithms such as SVM. By
applying the Decision Tree model for the network intrusion
of benchmark dataset NSL-KDD [105], three tasks were
performed: ranking the features, decision tree rule extraction,
and comparison with the state-of-the-art algorithms. The
ranking of network features was listed and it is noticeable
that not all features contributed to the decision of intrusion.
Besides, the advantages of the Decision Tree algorithm
compared with other popular classifiers, being
computationally cheaper and easy to explain were also
demonstrated in this work.
Syed et al. [213] suggested an Intrusion Detection System
that used the global explanations created by the SHAP and
Random Forest joint framework to detect all forms of
malicious intrusion in network traffic. The suggested
framework was composed of 2 stages of Random Forest
classifiers and one SHAP stage. SHAP provided explanations
for the outcome of the initial Random Forest classifier and
one decision of the first Random Forest classifier with low
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credibility would be reassessed by the secondary classifier.
This three-stage based architecture can increase user trust
while filtering out all cloaked dangerous network data by
introducing transparency to the decision-making process.
CSE-CIC IDS 2018 [214] dataset was utilized to evaluate the
performance of the proposed framework and the presented
architecture produced accuracy rates of 98.5 percent and 100
percent, respectively on the test dataset and adversarial
samples.
Tahmina et al. [215] proposed an XAI-based Machine
Learning system to detect malicious DoH traffic within DNS
over HTTPS protocol. publicly available CIRA-CICDoHBrw-2020 dataset [216] was utilized in the testing of the
proposed Balanced and Stacked Random Forest framework
and other Machine Learning algorithms including Gradient
Boosting and Generic Random Forest. The suggested
approach in this work got slightly greater precision (99.91
percent), recall (99.92 percent), and F1 score (99.91 percent)
over other methods for comparison. Additionally, feature
contributions to the detection results were also highlighted
with the help of the SHAP algorithm. The limitation of this
framework would be the inconsideration of DGA-related
DoH traffic from other HTTPS traffic.
7) DOMAIN GENERATION ALGORITHMS (DGA)

DGAs are a type of virus that is frequently used to generate a
huge number of domain names that can be utilized for
evasive communication with Command and Control (C2)
servers. It is challenging to prohibit harmful domains using
common approaches like blacklisting or sink-holing due to
the abundance of unique domain names. A DGA's dynamics
widely used a seeded function. Deterring a DGA strategy
presents a hurdle because an administrator would need to
recognize the virus, the DGA, and the seed value to filter out
earlier dangerous networks and subsequent servers in the
sequence. The DGA makes it more challenging to stop
unwanted communications because a skilled threat actor can
sporadically switch the server or location from which the
malware automatically calls back to the C2 [217]. Therefore,
blacklisting and other conventional malware management
techniques fall short in combating DGA attacks and many
machine learning classifiers have been suggested. These
classifiers allow for the identification of the DGA responsible
for the creation of a given domain name and consequently
start targeted remedial actions. However, it's challenging to
assess the inner logic due to the black box aspect and the
consequent lack of confidence makes it impossible to use
such models.
Franziska et al. [218] proposed a visual analytics
framework that offers clear interpretations of the models
created by deep learning model creators for the classification
of DGAs. The activations of the model's nodes were
clustered, and decision trees were utilized to illuminate these
clusters. The users can examine how the model sees the data
at different layers in conjunction with a 2D projection. A
drawback of the proposed strategy is that although the

decision trees can provide a possible explanation for the
clusters, this does not necessarily reflect how the model
classifies this data, especially when there are numerous
equally valid explanations.
EXPLAIN, a feature-based and contextless DGAs
multiclass classification framework was introduced by
Arthur et al. in [219] and compared with several state-of-theart classifiers such as RNN, CNN, SVM, RF, and ResNet
based on real-world datasets including DGArchive [220] and
University Network [221]. After the ResNet-based
techniques, the best model, EXPLAIN-OvRUnion, used 76
features and achieves the best F1-score. Moreover, Only 28
features were used by EXPLAIN-OvRRFE-PI and
EXPLAIN-RFRFE-PI, which outperformed all feature-based
strategies put out in previous work by a significant margin.
Additionally, they outperformed the deep learning-based
algorithms M-Endgame, M-Endgame.MI, and M-NYU in
terms of F1-scores as well.
To address the issues of DGAs classification including
which traffic should be trained in which network and when,
and how to measure resilience against adversarial assaults,
Arthur et al. [222] proposed two ResNets-based DGAs
detection classifiers, one for binary classification and the
other for multiclass classification. Experiments on real-world
datasets demonstrated that the proposed classifier performed
at least comparably to the best state-of-the-art algorithms for
the binary classification test with a very low false positive
rate, and significantly outperformed the competition in the
extraction of complex features. In addition, for the multiclass
classification problem, the ResNet-based classifier performed
better than previous work in attributing AGDs to DGAs for
the multiclass classification problem, achieving an
improvement of nearly 5 percent in F1-score while requiring
30 percent less training time than the next best classifier. In
the explainability analysis, it was also highlighted that some
of the self-learned properties employed by the deep learningbased systems.
8) DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS)

The Internet is seriously threatened by denial-of-service
(DoS) assaults, and numerous protection measures have been
suggested to address the issue. DoS attacks are ongoing
attacks in which malicious nodes produce bogus messages to
obstruct network traffic or drain the resources of other nodes
[223]. As the DoS attacks become increasingly complicated
in the past years, conventional Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) are finding it increasingly challenging to identify these
newer, more sophisticated DoS attacks because they use
more complicated patterns. To identify malicious DoS
assaults, numerous machine learning and deep learning
models have been deployed. Additionally, for the goal of
model transparency, XAI methods that investigate how
features contribute to or impact an algorithm-based choice
can be helpful [224].

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Access. This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3204051

TABLE 6. Details of XAI applications in defending mechanisms against different categories of cyber attacks.

Cyber
Learning models
attack types Reference
Year

Malware

Spam

2018
2020
2020
2021

√
√
√
√

[159]

CNN

2021

√

[160]

DT

2016

[161]

2022

√

√

√

√

√

[162]
[168]
[169]

RF, LR, DT,
GNB, and SVM
CNN
XGBoost
NB and RF

2021
2019
2020

√
√

√
√

√
√

√
√

√
√
√

[171]
[178]

RNN and CNN 2021
RF, NB, and LR 2022

√
√

√
√

√
√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

2019

√

√

√

VAEs and LSTM 2019

√

√

√

√

√

[183]
[184]
[187]

2022
2022
2021

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

2021

√

√

√

√

[190]

DCNN
ML
Autoencoder,
NB, RF and DT
RF, LGB, DT,
and LR
GNN

2022

√

√

√

[193]

Autoencoder

2021

√

√

√

[194]
[195]

2020
2019

√
√

√
√

2021

√

√

2021

√

√

[199]

Transfer Learning
Sequential
modeling
AP Clustering
and LSTM
Bi-LSTM and
pHDBSCAN
MMHAM

√

√

[200]

RF and SVM

2021

[202]

Phishpedia

2021

[203]

NB, LR, RF, and
SVM
XGBoost and
autoencoder
Neural network
and attention
DNN

2021

[204]
[205]
[206]
[207]
[208]

√

√

2022

2022

√

2022

√

2022

√

CNN, LSTM, and 2022
XGBoost
BiLSTM
2022

√

√
√
√
√

√

√

√

√
√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

[210]

DNN

2021

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

[211]

DNN

2021

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

[212]

DT

2021

√

RF
2021
Stacked RF
2022
CNN and RNN 2020

√
√

[213]
[215]
[219]
[220]

RNN, CNN,

2021

√

√
√
√

√

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

2018

[197]

Domain

√

√

√
√
√
√

DT

[196]

Network
Intrusion

DBSCAN

√

√
√

[182]

[189]

Phishing

Visual Arguments Models

SVM and RF
DNN
CNN
DNN

[181]

Fraud

XAI techniques
Global Model- Model- Post-hoc Intrinsic Text
specific agnostic
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

[150]
[154]
[157]
[158]

[179]
Botnet

Local

√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
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√

XAI
methods
gradient
heatmap
Grad-CAM
Generated
trees
Grad-CAM
, heatmap
Self
explainable
SHAP
LIME
SHAP
Self
explainable
LIME
LIME and
SHAP
Self
explainable
Visualized
tools
Self
explainable
SHAP
SHAP
LIME and
SHAP
Local
features
GNN
Explainer
Kernel
SHAP
HEN
Fraud
Memory
MIL
Feature
extraction
Self
explainable
LIME and
EBM
Visual
explanation
Theoretical
Perspective
SHAP
Self
explainable
LIME,
SHAPE, and
RuleFit
LIME and
SHAP
KHO,
LIME, and
SHAP
EDA,
BRCG, and
CEM
SHAP,
LIME, and
BRCG
Self
explainable
SHAP
SHAP
Clustering
and DT
EXPLAIN
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Generation
Algorithms
(DGA)
Denial-ofService
(DoS)

[222]

SVM, RF, and
ResNet
ResNet

2020

[225]
[226]
[228]

XGBoost
ML
DNN

2022
2021
2018

√
√

√
√

√

Boryau et al. [225] introduced CSTITool, a
CICFlowMeter-based flow extraction to feature extraction to
enhance the performance of the Machine Learning DoS
attack detection model. CICFlowMeter translated the flow
data from packets for the model's training. The size of the
data was significantly reduced during this process, which
decreased the need for data storage. Hacker attack data
including Network Service Scanning, Endpoint DoS, Brute
Force, and Remote Access Software from the dataset CICIDS2017 network flow data of malware from the dataset
CSTI-10 were utilized to train the XGBoost model. The
outcome demonstrated that the performance measurements
can be enhanced by using the additional descriptive flow
statistics produced by CSTITool. For instance, Rig’s
Precision and Recall increased by 1.23% and 1.59%
respectively. Moreover, XAI method SHAP was deployed to
further explore the relationship between cyberattacks and
network flow variables to better understand how the model
produced predictions.
In the context of DoS attack, Rendhir et al. [226] analyzed
the strategic decisions based on the KDD99 dataset [227]
with the XAI method of Testing with ConceptActivation
Vectors (TCAV). The approach investigates the connection
between the strategic choice, autonomous agent's objective,
and dataset properties. TCAVQ scores are obtained from the
KDD99 dataset for various DoS attacks and regular traffic.
The relationship between the goal availability and the
strategies TerminateConnection and AllocateMoreResources
is determined using the TCAVQ scores. In the event of
cyberattacks, the analysis is performed to support the choice
of the plan or, if necessary, a change in the strategy.
Kasun et al. [228] described the framework for
explainable DNNs-based DoS anomaly detection in process
monitoring. The user was given post-hoc explanations for
DNN predictions in the framework that is currently being
used. Based on the DoS attack benchmark dataset NSL-KDD
[105], experiments were implemented on several DNN
architectures, and it was found that on the test dataset, DNNs
were able to yield accuracies of 97%. Besides, according to
experimental findings, while classified as DoS, DNNs could
also provide a higher relevance to the number of connections,
connection frequency, and volume of data exchanged.
Therefore, this framework improves human operators'
confidence in the system by reducing the opaqueness of the
DNN-based anomaly detector.
B. XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY IN INDUSTRIAL
APPLICATIONS

√

√

√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√

√
√
√

Self
explainable
SHAP
TCAV
DNN
Explanation
Generator

In this subsection, we aim to present a comprehensive
overview of XAI studies for the cyber security of different
industrial areas, as shown in Figure 9. And the details of
these XAI implementations for cyber security in distinct
industries are shown in Table 7 as well.
1) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF HEALTHCARE

The use of big data, cloud computing, and IoT creates a
modern, intelligent healthcare industry. The use of the
Internet of Things, cutting-edge manufacturing technologies,
software, hardware, robots, sensors, and other sophisticated
information technologies, improves data connectivity.
Information and communication technology advancements
enhance the quality of healthcare by transforming
conventional healthcare organizations into smart healthcare
[229]. With the increasingly significant role of AI in
healthcare, there are growing concerns about the
vulnerabilities of the smart healthcare system. Smart
healthcare is a prime target for cybercrime for two main
reasons: a vast supply of valuable data and its defenses are
porous. Health information theft, ransomware attacks on
hospitals, and potential attacks on implanted medical
equipment are all examples of cyber security breaches.
Breaches can undermine smart healthcare systems, erode
patient trust, and endanger human life [230].
XAI comes into the picture as the smart healthcare system
demands transparency and explainability to decrease the
increasing vulnerabilities of the smart healthcare system due
to the increasingly connected mobile devices, more concern
for patients’ monitoring, and more mobile consumer devices.
There are many studies currently on implementing the XAI
framework to address the issue of privacy and security of the
smart healthcare system.
Devam et al. [231] introduced a study based on the heart
disease dataset and illustrated why explainability techniques
should be chosen when utilizing deep learning systems in the
medical field. This study then suggested and described
various example-based strategies, such as Anchors,
Counterfactuals,
Integrated
Gradients,
Contrastive
Explanation Method, and Kernel Shapley, which are crucial
for disclosing the nature of the model's black box and
ensuring model accountability. These XAI approaches were
compared with two benchmark XAI methods, LIME and
SHAP, as well. It was concluded that these discussed XAI
approaches all explained how different features contribute to
the outputs of the model. They are intuitive, which helps in
the process of understanding what the black box model
thinks and explains the model's behavior.
BrainGNN, an explainable graph neural network (GNN)
based framework to analyze functional magnetic resonance
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images (fMRI) and identify neurological biomarkers was
proposed by Xiaoxiao et al. [232]. Motivated by the
requirements for transparency and explainability in medical
image analysis, the proposed BrainGNN framework included
ROI-selection pooling layers (R-pool) that highlight
prominent ROIs (nodes in the graph) so that which ROIs are
crucial for prediction could be determined. By doing so, the
advantage of the BrainGNN framework could be the
allowance of users to interpret significant brain regions in
multiple ways.
The chain of reasoning behind Computer Aided
Diagnostics (CAD) is attracting attention to build trust in
CAD decisions from complicated data sources such as
electronic health records, magnetic resonance imaging scans,
cardiotocography, etc. To address this issue, Julian et al. [233]
presented a new algorithm, Adaptive-Weighted High
Importance Path Snippets (Ada-WHIPS) to explain
AdaBoost classification with logical and simple rules in the
context of CAD-related data sets. The weights in the
individual decision nodes of the internal decision trees of the
AdaBoost model are redistributed especially by Ada-WHIPS.
A single rule that dominated the model's choice is then
discovered using a straightforward heuristic search of the
weighted nodes. Moreover, according to experiments on nine
CAD-related data sets, Ada-WHIPS explanations typically
generalize better (mean coverage 15 percent to 68 percent)
than the state of the art while being competitive for
specificity.
A novel human-in-the-loop XAI system, XAI-Content
based Image Retrieval (CBIR), was introduced by Deepak et
al. in [234] to retrieve video frames from minimally invasive
surgery (MIS) videos that are comparable to a query image
based on content. MIS video frames were processed using a
self-supervised deep learning algorithm to extract semantic
features. The search results were then iteratively refined
using an iterative query refinement technique, which utilized
a binary classifier that has been trained online using user
feedback on relevance. The saliency map, which provided a
visual description of why the system deems a retrieved image
to be similar to the query image, was produced using an XAI
technique. The proposed XAI-CBIR system was tested using
the publicly available Cholec80 dataset, which contains 80
films of minimally invasive cholecystectomy procedures.
2) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF SMART CITIES

As increasingly data-driven artificial intelligence services
such as IoT, blockchain, and deep learning are incorporated
into contemporary smart cities, smart cities are able to offer
intelligent services for energy, transportation, healthcare, and
entertainment to both city locals and visitors by real-time
environmental monitoring [235]. However, smart city
applications not only gather a variety of information from
people and their social circles that are sensitive to privacy,
but also control municipal services and have an impact on
people's life, cyber security, cyber crime, and privacy
problems about smart cities arise. To address this issue, XAI

integration into IoT and AI-enabled smart city applications
can help to address black-box model difficulties and offer
transparency and explainability components for making
useful data-driven decisions for smart city applications.
Smart city applications are usually utilized in high-risk and
privacy-sensitive scenarios. Therefore, it is crucial to
establish an effective XAI approach to give authorities
additional information about the justification, implications,
potential throughput, and an in-depth explanation of
background procedures to aid in final decision-making [236].
Roland et al. [237] introduced a tree-based method
Gradient Boosted Regression Trees (GBRT) model in
conjunction with the SHAP-value framework to identify and
analyze major patterns of meteorological determinants of
PM1 species and overall PM1 concentrations. SIRTA [238],
a ground-based atmospheric observatory dataset for cloud
and aerosol was utilized to experiment and the location for
establishing this dataset was in the city of Paris. The findings
of this study show that shallow MLHs, cold temperatures,
and low wind speeds play distinct roles during peak PM1
events in winter. Under high-pressure synoptic circulation,
northeastern wind input frequently intensifies these
conditions.
One of the most demanded bus lines of Madrid was
analyzed by Leticia et al. in [239] to make the smart city
transport network more efficient by predicting bus passenger
demand. The proposed method created an interpretable
model from the Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) neural
network that enhances the generated XAI model's linguistic
interpretability without sacrificing precision using a surrogate
model and the 2-tuple fuzzy linguistic model. The public
transportation business can save money and energy by using
passenger demand forecasting to plan its resources most
effectively. This methodology can also be used in the future
to forecast passenger demand for other forms of
transportation (air, railway, marine).
Georgios et al. [240] proposed explainable models for
early prediction of certification in Massive Open Online
Courses (MOOCs) for Smart City Professionals. MOOCs
have grown significantly over the past few years due to
Covid-19 and tend to become the most common type of
online and remote higher education. Several Machine
Learning classification techniques such as Adaptive Boosting,
Gradient Boosting, Extremely Randomized Trees, Random
Forest, and Logistic Regression were utilized to build
corresponding predictive models using PyCaret. And the
XAI method SHAP summary plot was employed to the
classifiers including LightGBM, GB, and RF. Furthermore,
new classification models based only on the two most
important features in each step gained from the SHAP
summary plot. And the experimental results showed that the
effectiveness of all methods was slightly improved for all
metrics.
3) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF SMART FARMING
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Smart farming refers to the use of cutting-edge technology in
agriculture, including IoT, robots, drones, sensors, and
geolocation systems. Big data, cloud computing, AI, and
augmented reality are the engines of smart farming as well.
However, the addition of several communication modules
and AI models leaves the system open to cyber-security risks
and threats to the infrastructure for smart farming [241]. And
cyber attacks can harm nations' economies that heavily rely
on agriculture. However, due to the black box nature of most
AI models, users cannot understand the connections between
features. This is crucial when the system is designed to
simulate physical farming events with socioeconomic effects
like evaporation [242]. Therefore, many researchers are
working on the implementation potentials of XAI applied in
smart farming cyber security.
Nidhi et al. [242] presented an IoT and XAI-based
framework to detect plant diseases such as rust and blast in
pearl millet. Parametric data from the pearl millet farmland at
ICAR, Mysore, India was utilized to train the proposed
Custom-Net Deep Learning Models, reaching a classification
accuracy of 98.78% which is similar to state-of-the-art
models including Inception ResNet-V2, Inception-V3,
ResNet-50, VGG-16, and VGG-19 and superior to them in
terms of reducing the training time by 86.67%. Additionally,
the Grad-CAM is used to display the features that the
Custom-Net extracted to make the framework more
transparent and explainable.
To thoroughly assess the variables that can potentially
explain why agricultural land is used for plantations of wheat,
maize, and olive trees, Viana et al. [243] implemented an ML
and agnostic-model approach to show global and local
explanations of the most important variables. Machine
Learning model Random Forest and XAI approach LIME
were deployed for analysis and approximately 140 variables
related to agricultural socioeconomic, biophysical, and
bioclimatic factors were gathered. By applying the proposed
framework, it is found that the three crop plantations in the
research area's usage of agricultural land were explained by
five major factors: drainage density, slope, soil type, and the
ombrothermic index anomaly (for humid and dry years).
4) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF SMART FINANCIAL
SYSTEM

The financial system has been rapidly altered by AI models,
which offer cost savings and improved operational efficiency
in fields like asset management, investment advice, risk
forecasting, lending, and customer service [244]. On one
hand, the ease of using AI in these smart financial systems
provides efficiency for all parties involved, but on the other
hand, the risk of cyberattacks on them is growing
exponentially. Attackers have traditionally been motivated
primarily by money, making smart financial systems their top
choice of target. To combat the finance crime targeting smart
financial systems, one of the primary priorities in the smart
financial domain should be the implementation of XAI [245].
The reason behind this issue is that it is essential in these

extremely sensitive areas such as Money Laundering
detection and Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions to not
only have a highly accurate and robust model but also to be
able to produce helpful justifications to win a user's faith in
the automated system.
Swati et al. [246] proposed a belief-rule-based automated
AI decision-support system for loan underwriting (BRB).
This system can take into account human knowledge and can
employ supervised learning to gain knowledge from prior
data. Factual and heuristic rules can both be accommodated
by BRB's hierarchical structure. The significance of rules
triggered by a data point representing a loan application and
the contribution of attributes in activated rules can both be
used to illustrate the decision-making process in this system.
The textual supplied to rejected applicants as justification for
declining requesters’ loan applications might have been
started by the progression of events from the factual-rulebase to the heuristic-rule-base.
A novel methodology for producing plausible
counterfactual explanations for the Corporate Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A) Deep Transformers system was
presented by Linyi et al. [247]. The proposed transformerbased classifier made use of the regularization advantages of
adversarial training to increase model resilience. More
significantly, a masked language model for financial text
categorization that improved upon prior methods to measure
the significance of words and guarantee the creation of
credible counterfactual explanations was developed. When
compared to state-of-art methods including SVM, CNN,
BiGRU, and HAN, the results show greater accuracy and
explanatory performance.
An interactive, evidence-based method to help customers
understand and believe the output produced by AI-enabled
algorithms was generated for analyzing customer
transactions in the smart banking area by Ambreen [248]. A
digital dashboard was created to make it easier to engage
with algorithm results and talk about how the suggested XAI
method can greatly boost data scientists' confidence in their
ability to comprehend the output of AI-enabled algorithms.
In the proposed model, a Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN)
was utilized to classify the multi-class scenario of bank
transaction classification.
5) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF HUMAN-COMPUTER
INTERACTION (HCI)

HCI enables people to comprehend and engage with
technology by establishing an effective channel of
communication. And HCI's primary goal is to create
interactions that take users' wants and abilities into account
[249]. In the field of HCI, security and privacy have long
been significant research concerns, where Usable Security
has arisen as an interdisciplinary research area. On the other
hand, HCI and AI emerge together in such a way that AI
imitates human behavior to create intelligent systems,
whereas HCI tries to comprehend human behavior to modify
the machine to increase user experience, safety, and
9
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efficiency. However, from an HCI standpoint, there is no
assurance that an AI system's intended users will be able to
comprehend it. And according to the user-centered design
(UCD), a design must offer an understandable AI that cyberattacks the requirements and skills of the intended users (e.g.,
knowledge level). Therefore, the final objective of XAI in
HCI should be to guarantee that target users can comprehend
the outcomes, assisting them in becoming more efficient
decision-makers [250].
Gaur et al. [251] utilized XAI methods including LIME
and SHAP in conjunction with machine learning algorithms
including Logistic Regression(80.87%), Support Vector
Machine(85.8%), K-nearest Neighbour(87.24%), Multilayer
Perceptron(91.94%), and Decision Tree(100%) to build a
robust explainable HCI model for examining the mini-mental
state for Alzheimer’s disease. It is worth mentioning that the
most significant features contributing to the Alzheimer's
disease examing were different for the LIME-based
framework and the SHAP-based framework. In contrast to
nWBV's dominance of the LIME features, MMSE makes a
significant contribution to Shapely values.
To fill the gap few publications on artistic image
recommendation systems give an understanding of how users
perceive various features of the system, including domain
expertise, relevance, explainability, and trust, Vicente et al.
[252] examed several aspects of the user experience with a
recommender system of artistic photos from algorithmic and
HCI perspectives. Three different recommender interfaces
and two different Visual Content-based Recommender
(VCBR) algorithms were employed in this research.
Q. Vera et al. [253] presented a high-level introduction of
the XAI algorithm's technical environment, followed by a
selective examination of current HCI works that use humancentered design, evaluation, and provision of conceptual and
methodological tools for XAI. Human-centered XAI was
highlighted in this research, and the emerged research
communities of human-centered XAI were introduced in the
context of HCI.
6) XAI FOR CYBER SECURITY OF SMART
TRANSPORTATION

The emergence of cutting-edge technologies including
software-defined networks (SDNs), IIoT, Blockchain, AI,
and vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) has increased
operational complexity while smoothly integrating smart
transportation systems [254]. However, it can experience
security problems that leave the transportation systems open
to intrusion. In addition, security concerns in transportation
technology affect the AI model [255]. Major transportation
infrastructures such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN),
Vehicle-to-everything communication (V2X), VMS, and
Traffic Signal Controllers (TSC) have either already been
targeted or are still susceptible to hacking. To defend against
these cyber attacks and prevent the potential cyber threats on
the smart transportation system, AI-enabled intrusion
detection systems are introduced recently. Although In the

past few years, AI has made significant progress in providing
effective performance in smart transportation systems, the
XAI methods are still required as XAI could make it possible
for the smart transportation system to monitor transportation
details such as drivers’ behaviour, accicent causes, and
vechicles’ conditions.
A Machine Learning approach to detect misbehaving
vehicles in the Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANET) was
proposed by Harsh et al. [256]. In the smart VANET, the
performance of each vehicle depends upon the information
from other autonomous vehicles (AVs). Therefore, the
misinformation from misbehaving vehicles would damage
the entire VANET as a whole and detecting misbehaving
would be significant to build a stable and safe VANET
system. Vehicular reference misbehavior (VeReMi) dataset
[257] was utilized in an ensemble learning using Random
Forest algorithm and a decision tree-based algorithm and
accuracy and F1 score of 98.43% and 98.5% were achieved
respectively.
Shideh et al. [258] described a transportation energy
model (TEM) that forecasts home transportation energy use
using XAI technique LIME. Data from Household Travel
Survey (HTS), which is utilized to train the artificial neural
network accurately, has been deployed in TEM and high
validation accuracy (83.4%) was developed. For certain
traffic analysis zones (TAZs), the significance and impact
(local explanation) of HTS inputs (such as household travel,
demographics, and neighborhood data) on transportation
energy consumption are studied. The explainability of the
proposed TEM framework can help the home transportation
energy distribution in two ways, including describing the
local inference mechanisms on individual (household)
predictions and assessing the model's level of confidence can
be done using a broad grasp of the model.
C. Bustos et al. [259] provided an automated scheme for
reducing traffic-related fatalities by utilizing a variety of
Computer Vision techniques (classification, segmentation,
and interpretability techniques). An explainability analysis
based on image segmentation and class activation mapping
on the same images, as well as an adaptation and training of a
Residual Convolutional Neural Network to establish a danger
index for each specific urban scene, are all steps in this
process. This computational approach results in a finegrained map of risk levels across a city as well as a heuristic
for identifying potential measures to increase both pedestrian
and automobile safety.
C. CYBER THREATS TARGETING XAI AND DEFENSIVE
APPROACHES

In the above sections, the applications of XAI in different
areas to defend against different cyber threats have been
discussed. Nevertheless, although XAI could be effective in
protecting other areas and models by providing transparency
and explainability, XAI models themselves would face cyber
threats as well. Both the AI models deployed and the
9
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explainability part could be vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Some cyber attackers even utilize the explainable
characteristics to attack the XAI model. Therefore, we deem
it necessary to review the cyber threats targeting XAI and
corresponding defensive approaches against them in this
review.
Apart from the different parts that conventional AI models
need to protect, including samples, learning models, and the
interoperation processes, the explainable part of XAI-based
models should be paid attention to as well. The following
researches describe some cyber attacks targeting XAI models
using different approaches from different perspectives.
A novel black box attack was developed by Aditya et al.
[260] to examine the consistency, accuracy, and confidence
security characteristics of gradient-based XAI algorithms.
The proposed black box attack focused on two categories of
attack: CI and I attack. While I attack attempts to attack the
single explainer without affecting the classifier's prediction
given a natural sample, the CI attack attempts to
simultaneously compromise the integrity of the underlying
classifier and explainer. It is demonstrated that the
effectiveness of the attack on various gradient-based
explainers as well as three security-relevant data sets and
models through empirical and qualitative evaluation.
Thi-Thu-Huong et al. [261] proposed a robust adversarial
image patch (AIP) that alters the causes of interpretation
model prediction outcomes and leads to incorrect deep neural
networks (DNNs) model predictions, such as gradientweighted class activation mapping. Four tests pertaining to
the suggested methodology were carried out on the ILSVRC
image dataset. There are two different kinds of pre-trained
models (i.e., feature and no feature layer). The Visual
Geometry Group 19-Batch Normalization (VGG19-BN) and
Wide Residual Networks models, in particular, were used to
test the suggested strategy (Wide ResNet 101). Two more
pre-trained models: Visual Geometry Group 19 (VGG19)
and Residual Network (ResNext 101 328d), were also
deployed whereas masks and heatmaps from Grad-CAM
results were utilized to evaluate the results.
Tamp-X, a unique approach that manipulates the
activations of powerful NLP classifiers was suggested by
Hassan et al. [262], causing cutting-edge white-box and
black-box XAI techniques to produce distorted explanations.
Two steps were carried out to evaluate state-of-art XAI
methods, including the white-box InteGrad andSmoothGrad,
and the black-box—LIME and SHAP. The first step was to
randomly mask keywords and observe their impact on NLP
classifiers whereas the second step was to tamper with the
activation functions of the classifiers and evaluate the outputs.
Additionally, three cutting-edge adversarial assaults were
utilized to test the tampered NLP classifiers and it was found
that the adversarial attackers have a much tougher time
fooling the tampered classifiers.
Slack et al. [263] provided a unique scaffolding method
that, by letting an antagonistic party create any explanation

they want, effectively masks the biases of any given classifier.
Extensive experimental testing using real data from the
criminal justice and credit scoring fields showed that the
proposed fooling method was successful in producing
adversarial classifiers that can trick post-hoc explanation
procedures, including LIME and SHAP, with LIME being
found to be more susceptible than SHAP. In detail, it was
demonstrated how highly biased (racist) classifiers created by
the proposed fooling framework can easily deceive wellliked explanation techniques like LIME and SHAP into
producing innocent explanations which do not reflect the
underlying biases using extensive evaluation with numerous
real-world datasets (including COMPAS [264]).
Simple, model-agnostic, and intrinsic Gradient-based NLP
explainable approaches are considered faithful compared
with other state-of-art XAI approaches including SHAP and
LIME. However, Junlin et al. [265] show how the gradientsbased explanation methods can be fooled by creating a
FACADE classifier that could be combined with any
particular model having deceptive gradients. Although the
gradients in the final model are dominated by the customized
FACADE model, the predictions are comparable to those of
the original model. They also demonstrated that the proposed
method can manipulate a variety of gradient-based analysis
methods: saliency maps, input reduction, and adversarial
perturbations all misclassify tokens as being very significant
and of low importance.
On the other hand, to defend against these cyber threats
targeting XAI models, researchers also developed several
defensive approaches, divided into three main categories:
modifying the training process and input data, modifying the
model network, and sing auxiliary tools.
Gintare et al. [266] assessed how JPG compression affects
the categorization of adversarial images. Experimental tests
demonstrated that JPG compression could undo minor
adversarial perturbations brought forth by the Fast-GradientSign technique. JPG compression could not undo the
adversarial perturbation, nevertheless, if the perturbations are
more significant. In this situation, neural network classifiers'
strong inductive bias cause inaccurate yet confident
misclassifications.
Ji et al. [267] present DeepCloak, a defense technique.
DeepCloak reduces the capacity an attacker may use to
generate adversarial samples by finding and eliminating
pointless characteristics from a DNN model, increasing the
robustness against such adversarial attacks. In this work, the
mask layer, inserted before processing the DNN model,
encoded the discrepancies between the original images and
related adversarial samples, as well as between these images
and the output features of the preceding network model layer.
Pouya et al. [268] Defense-GAN, a novel defense
technique leveraging GANs to strengthen the resilience of
classification models against adversarial black-box and
white-box attacks. The proposed approach was demonstrated
to be successful against the majority of frequently thought-of
9
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attack tactics without assuming a specific assault model. On
two benchmark computer vision datasets, we empirically
demonstrate that Defense-GAN consistently offers
acceptable defense while other approaches consistently
struggled against at least one sort of assault.
VI. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. CHALLENGES OF USING XAI FOR CYBER
SECURITY

We have reviewed the state-of-art XAI techniques utilized in
the defense of different cyber attacks and the protection of
distinct industrial cyber security domains. It is noticeable that
although XAI could be a powerful tool in the application of
different cyber security domains, XAI faces certain
challenges in its application of cyber security. And in this
section, we will discuss these challenges.
1) DATASETS

An overview of the famous and commonly used datasets of
different cyber attacks and distinct industries was provided in
Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. However, there is a severe
issue with the most used cyber security datasets, i.e. many
datasets are not updated in certain directions. For instance,
the most famous datasets about spam detection were more
than 10 years before. This phenomenon may be caused by
privacy and ethical issues. Therefore, the most recent
categories of cyber attacks were not included in the public
cyber attack datasets, which would lead to inefficiency in the
training of the XAI applications in the establishment of cyber
attack defensive mechanisms. Although the industrial
datasets in areas such as healthcare, smart agriculture, and
smart transportation include more recent samples than the
datasets for cyber attacks, these datasets should be updated as
well because cyber attacks are becoming more sophisticated
and diverse these days. Another issue with the currently
available datasets is that these datasets usually lack a large
volume of data available for the training of XAI methods,
which will decrease both the performance and the
explainability of the XAI approaches. Another reason behind
this situation is that some of the information related to cyber
attacks and cyber industries is redundant and unbalanced.
Other than that, the heterogeneity of samples collected in
these datasets is a challenge for the XAI models as well. The
number of features and categories varies for each dataset and
some datasets are composed of human-generated cyber
attacks rather than exhibiting real-world and latest attacks.
These problems highlight the challenge that the most recent
benchmark datasets with a massive amount of data for
training and testing and a balanced and equal number of
attack categories are still to be identified.
2) EVALUATION

Evaluation measure for XAI systems is another important
factor in the application of XAI approaches for cyber security.
When evaluating the performance of the established XAIbased cyber security systems, several conventional
evaluation metrics including F1-Score, Precision, and ROC

could be utilized to measure the performance of the proposed
mechanisms. However, when applying XAI methods in the
cyber security domains, measurements to evaluate the
accuracy and completeness of explanations from the XAI
systems are required. In general, the evaluation
measurements of XAI systems should be able to assess the
quality, value, and satisfaction of explanations, the
enhancement of the users’ mental model brought about by
model explanations, and the impact of explanations on the
effectiveness of the model as well as on the users’ confidence
and reliance. Unfortunately, the findings derived from the
above reviews of this survey demonstrate the challenge that:
more generic, quantifiable XAI system evaluation
measurements are required to support the community's
suggested XAI explainability measuring techniques and tools.
Popular XAI explanation evaluation measurements can be
divided into two main categories: user satisfaction and
computational measurements. However, user satisfactionbased evaluation approaches are dependent on user feedback
or interview, which may cause privacy issues for many cyber
security problems. On the other hand, for computational
measurements, many researchers utilize inherently
interpretable models [56] (e.g., linear regression and decision
trees) to compare with the generated explanations.
Nevertheless, there are no benchmark comparison models for
this evaluation approach, and the users’ understanding of the
explanation could not be reflected. Besides, the XAI
evaluation systems lack measurements focusing on some
other significant factors of the cyber security domain
including computational resources as well as computational
power. In conclusion, it is necessary to take into account a set
of agreed-upon standard explainability evaluation metrics for
comparison to make future improvements for XAI
applications in cyber security.
3) CYBER THREATS FACED BY XAI MODELS

As we discussed in Section V, although XAI methods can
provide transparency and explainability to AI-enabled
systems to prevent cyber threats, the current XAI models are
facing many cyber attacks targeting the vulnerabilities of the
explanation approaches, which is extremely dangerous for
the cyber security systems as they always require a high level
of safety. For instance, many researchers [263] [264] have
proved the fact that it is possible to fool some of the most
popular XAI explanation methods such as LIME and SHAP,
which are also frequently deployed in the XAI application of
cyber security areas. It is demonstrated that the explanations
generating processes of those state-of-art XAI methods might
be counter-intuitive. Other than that, in the practical
industrial cyber security domains, such as XAI-enabled face
authentication systems. Although in Section V, we have
discussed several defensive methods against cyber threats
targeting XAI systems, most defensive approaches focus on
the protection of the performance of the prediction results of
XAI models rather than the explanation results. However, for
XAI-based cyber security systems, the explainability of the
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models is significant to maintain the transparency and
efficiency of the entire system and prevent the cyber attacks
as well.
4) PRIVACY AND ETHICAL ISSUES

In addition to the aforementioned technical challenges,
privacy and ethical issues are also crucial challenges when
implementing XAI in cyber security. During the system life
cycle, XAI models must explicitly take privacy concerns into
account. It is commonly agreed that respecting every person's
right to privacy is essential, especially in some very sensitive
areas of cyber security, for instance, authentication, e-mails,
and password. Moreover, XAI systems naturally fall within
the general ethical concern of potential discrimination (such
as racism, sexism, and ageism) by AI systems. In theory,
identical biases may be produced by any AI model that is
built using previously collected data from humans. It is
important to take precautions to ensure that there is no
discrimination, bias, or unfairness in the judgments made by
the XAI system and the explanations that go along with them.
The ethical bias of XAI systems should be eliminated in
terms of justification as well as explainability, in particular in
specific domains of cyber security applications. For privacy
issues, because the data are gathered from security-related
sources, the privacy and security-related concerns increase.
Therefore, it is essential to guarantee that data and models are
protected from adversarial assaults and being tampered with
by unauthorized individuals, which means that only
authorized individuals should be permitted access to XAI
models.
B. KEY INSIGHTS LEARNED FROM USING XAI FOR
CYBER SECURITY

In this section, some key insights learned from using XAI for
cyber security will be discussed based on the review in the
above sections. The main insights for the XAI
implementation in cyber security systems can be itemized as
follows:
1) User trust and reliance should be satisfied. By
offering explanations, an XAI system can increase
end users' trust in the XAI-based cyber security
system. Users of an XAI system can test their
perception of the system's correctness and reliability.
Users become dependent on the system as a result
of their trust in the XAI-based cyber security
system.
2) Model visualization and inspection should be
considered. Cyber security experts could benefit
from XAI system visualization and explainability to
inspect model uncertainty and trustworthiness.
Additionally, identifying and analyzing XAI model
and system failure cases is another crucial
component of model visualization and inspection.
3) Model tuning and selection are crucial factors to
ensure the efficiency of the XAI model

implemented in cyber security. Selecting different
explanation approaches for distinct Machine
Learning or Deep Learning algorithms in different
cyber security tasks would influence the
performance and explainability of XAI models
significantly. Other than that, the tuning process of
parameters and model structures of the established
XAI model is another crucial consideration as well.
4) The model defense could be highlighted in
particular for cyber security tasks as they are the
main targets for cyber attackers. Especially for
XAI-based cyber security mechanisms, the decision
model, security data as well as the explanation
process should be protected to prevent cyber threats.
5) Privacy awareness is another insight that XAI
methods could provide for the cyber security system.
Giving end users of cyber security systems a way to
evaluate their data privacy is a significant objective
in the application of XAI. End-users could learn
through XAI explanations about what user data is
used in algorithmic decision-making.
C. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
1) HIGH-QUALITY DATASETS

The quantity and quality of the available datasets have a
significant impact on how well XAI methods work for the
cyber security system, and the biases and constraints of the
datasets used to train the models have an impact on how
accurate the decisions and explanations are. On the other
hand, as we discussed in the above sections, the existing
available cyber security datasets could not reflect the most
recent cyber attacks due to privacy and ethical issues. Data
from real networks or the Internet typically contain sensitive
information, such as personal or business details, and if made
publicly available, they may disclose security flaws in the
network from which they originated. Additionally, the
imbalance of both volumes and features of the datasets would
influence the establishment of the XAI-based cyber security
system negatively as well. Therefore, the construction of both
high-quality and up-to-date datasets available for XAI
applications for cyber security could be a possible future
research direction.
2) TRADE-OFF BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND
EXPLAINABILITY

It is essential for cyber security experts to maintain the tradeoff between performance and explainability aspects of the
newly introduced XAI-enabled cyber security systems. It is
noticeable that although for some self-explainable XAI
approaches, for instance, Decision Tree, the model is quite
transparent and users could understand the decision-making
process easier, the performance of those approaches could
not always be satisfying. On the other hand, the AI
algorithms that now often perform best (for example, Deep
Learning) are the least explainable, causing a demand for
9

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

This article has been accepted for publication in IEEE Access. This is the author's version which has not been fully edited and
content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3204051

explainable models that can achieve high performance. Some
researchers have exploited this area, including authors of
[269] significantly reduce the trade-off between efficiency
and performance by introducing XAI for DNN into existing
quantization techniques. And authors of [270] demonstrated
that the wavelet modifications provided could lead to
significantly smaller, simplified, more computationally
efficient, and more naturally interpretable models, while
simultaneously keeping performance. However, there is a
lack of research focusing on the trade-off of performance and
explainability of XAI approaches applied in cyber security.
3) USER-CENTERED XAI

The human understandability of XAI approaches has become
the focus of some recent studies to find new potential for its
application in areas of cyber security. As we mentioned in
the above sections, user satisfaction with the generated
explanation is a significant component of the XAI
approaches to explainability evaluation. However, in areas of
cyber security, the questionnaire and feedback of users are
limited to some degree due to security concerns. Therefore,
how to generate user-centered XAI systems for cyber
security end users in terms of user understanding, user
satisfaction, and user performance without violating the
security issues could be a future research direction.
4) MULTIMODAL XAI

Multimodal information of text, video, audio, and images in
the same context can all be easily understood by people. The
benefit of multimodality is its capacity to gather and combine
important and comprehensive data from a range of sources,
enabling a far richer depiction of the issue at hand. In some
cyber security industrial areas, such as healthcare, medical
decisions are primarily driven by a variety of influencing
variables originating from a plurality of underlying signals
and information bases, which highlights the need for
multimodality at every stage. On the other hand, due to the
application of XAI in these areas, multimodal XAI could be
developed in near future.
5) ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS AND DEFENSES

As we discussed in this review, although XAI could be
applied in cyber security to prevent cyber attacks, the XAI
model performance and explainability could be attacked as
well. Other than that, the adversarial inputs to the sample
data should be paid attention to as well. Some researchers
[263] have already developed powerful tools to fool the stateof-art XAI methods including LIME and SHAP. However,
although the cyber threats and corresponding defensive
mechanisms focusing on the performance of AI models have
been studied recently, the adversarial attacks and defenses
against the explainability of XAI models still require further
research.
6) PROTECTION OF DATA

In cyber security areas, confidentiality and protection of data
are significant issues as privacy and ethical issues are
highlighted recently. For XAI-based systems, the situation is

even more severe as both the decisions and the explanations
related to users should be preserved. As a result, there is a
conflict between using big data for security and safeguarding
it. Data must be guaranteed to be safe from adversarial
assaults and manipulation by unauthorized users and
legitimate users should also be able to access the data.
Therefore, the protection of data and generated explanations
of XAI systems could be a future research direction as well.
VII. CONCLUSION

XAI is a powerful framework to introduce explainability and
transparency to the decisions of conventional AI models
including Deep Learning and Machine Learning. On the
other hand, cyber security is an area where transparency and
explainability are required to defend against cyber security
threats and analyze generated security decisions. Therefore,
in this paper, we presented a comprehensive survey of stateof-art research regarding XAI for cyber security applications.
We concluded the basic principles and taxonomies of stateof-art XAI models with essential tools, such as a general
framework and available datasets. We also investigated the
most advanced XAI-based cyber security systems from
different perspectives of application scenarios, including XAI
applications in defending against different categories of
cyber attacks, XAI for cyber security in distinct industrial
applications, and cyber threats targeting XAI models and
corresponding defensive approaches. Some common cyber
attacks including malware, spam, fraud, DoS, DGAs,
phishing, network intrusion, and botnet were introduced. The
corresponding defensive mechanisms utilizing XAI against
them were presented. The implementation of XAI in various
industrial areas namely in smart healthcare, smart financial
systems, smart agriculture, smart cities, smart transportation,
and Human-Computer Interaction were described
exhausively. Distinct approaches of cyber attacks targeting
XAI models and the related defensive methods were
introduced as well. In continuation to these, we pointed out
and discussed some challenges, key insights and research
directions of XAI applications in cyber security. We hope
that this paper could serve as a reference for researchers,
developers, and security professionals who are interested in
using XAI models to solve challenging issues in cyber
security domains.
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